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Judicial Review of Informal Agency Action:
A Case Study of Shareholder Proposal
No-Action Letters
By HowARD L. VICKERY HI*
Direct judicial review of informal administrative action in the field
Qf securities regulation is a recent phenomenon. In the pioneering
opinion Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC,1 the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, held that a decision by
the commission to affirm a Securities Exchange Commission staff
recommendation that no action be taken to force Dow Chemical to
include a shareholder proposal in its proxy materials had the earmarks
of a formal order reviewable in the court of appeals. Subsequently,
the same circuit in National Automatic Laundry and Cleaning Council
v. Shultze held that an informal interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act issued by the wage and hour administrator was reviewable in
the district courts under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court
stated, however, that informal staff interpretations of the act were not
reviewable under the APA. In Kixmiller v. SEC,3 the District of
Columbia Circuit returned to the problem of direct review of shareholder proposal no-action letters. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review a no-action recommendation by the SEC staff where the
commission refused to review or to comment upon the determination
made by its staff. From a pragmatic viewpoint, this result is disturbing because there appears to be little practical difference between a
decision made by the SEC staff not to intervene on behalf of a shareholder and a no-action decision approved by the commission itself.
When the dust settled from the first set of opinions extending
direct judicial review to informal agency actions, the following results
*
Berkeley;
1.
2.
3.

B.A., 1970, Swarthmore College; M.A., 1971, University of California at
J.D., 1975, University of Chicago; member of the California Bar.
432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
443 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
492 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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became evident. First, informal action by the head of an agency is presumptively reviewable in two courts: in the district courts under the
Administrative Procedure Act or, where applicable, in the appellate
courts under a standard review provision found in many of the administrative acts. Second, informal staff action is not subject to direct
review, even though the bulk of informal agency action is accomplished
by subordinates. Third, informal staff action can have severe practical
consequences for affected parties. Finally, the dichotomy between staff
action and action by the head of the agency enables an agency to avoid
judicial review by having decisions made at the staff level.
This article will suggest that the District of Columbia Circuit, in
a well-intentioned effort to extend direct judicial review to informal
administrative action, started off on the wrong foot in Medical Committee.4 The court distorted both the law and the nature of a shareholder
proposal no-action letter in order to find that it qualified as an order
reviewable in the court of appeals under section 25(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.r In fact, section 25(a) and similar review provisions in other administrative acts6 are reserved for formal administrative actions, which in most cases involve the performance of quasi-judicial functions by the administrative body. Informal administrative
action, in the author's view, should be exclusively reviewed in the district courts under the Administrative Procedure Act. This article will
also take issue with the ruling in National Automatic Laundry7 that
informal staff action is automatically unreviewable. The courts would
4.

432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).

5.

"A person aggrieved by a final order of the Commission entered pursuant to

this chapter may obtain review of the order in the United States Court of Appeals...

by filing in such court, within sixty days after the entry of the order, a written petition
requesting that the order be modified or set aside in whole or in part."
78y(a)(1) (Supp.V, 1975).

15 U.S.C. §

6. Section 25(a) is similar to the statutory provisions for petitions for review to
the court of appeals contained in the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(c)
(1970); the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77i (1970); the Public Utilities Holding
Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 79x (1970); the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b)
(1970); the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 371(f) (1970); the
Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 27 U.S.C. § 204(h) (1970); the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1970); the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1930, 29
U.S.C. § 210(a) (Supp. V, 1975); the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)

(1970); the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1486 (1970); and at least ten additional
statutes. See generally 3 K. DAViS, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TREATISE § 23.03 (1958 &
Supp. 1970) [hereinafter cited as DAvis]. Consequently, in construing section 25(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act, a court should look to cases arising under related review
provisions in other administrative statutes.
7. 443 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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be better advised to focus upon the practical effect of informal staff
action rather than the level at which administrative action is taken.
The standard ripeness tests," when applied to informal staff action, are
sufficient to protect the administrative agencies from premature and
excessive interference by the courts.

I. Background
A. SEC Procedure for Handling Disputed Shareholder Proposals
Section 14(a)9 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits

the solicitation of proxies in contravention of the rules and regulations
prescribed by the SEC. In 1942, the SEC promulgated its first fullfledged shareholder proposal rule under this section. The rule

required corporate management "to include in its proxy statement any
shareholder proposal which was 'a proper subject for action by the
security holders. "',0 If management intended to oppose the security

holder's proposal, the proxy materials had to contain a one hundredword statement by the shareholder in favor of his proposal.
Originally, it was thought that the criteria for determining the
proper subject for shareholder consideration criteria could be found
solely by reference to state law. State law on the topic, however, proved
scanty,:" and the SEC began to develop its own law defining appro-

priate areas for shareholder action. Now, rule 14a-8 (c) incorporates
five detailed exceptions to the general requirement that management
include shareholder proposals in its proxy materials.' 2 The SEC has
8. See text accompanying notes 178-86 infra.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970).
10. Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 677, quoting 7 Fed.
Reg. 10,659 (1942).
11. See Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 677; 2 L. Loss,
SECURrriEs REGULATION 905-06 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
12. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c) (1976). Shareholder proposals may be omitted
from the management's proxy materials under any of the following circumstances:
"(1) If the proposal as submitted is, under the laws of the issuer's domicile, not a
proper subject for action by security holders; or
(2) If the proposal:
(i) Relates to the enforcement of a personal claim or the redress of a personal
grievance against the issuer, its management, or any other person, or
(i) Consists of a recommendation, request, or mandate that action be taken with
respect to any matter, including a general economic, political, racial, religious, social,
or similar cause, that is not significantly related to the business of the issuer or is not
within the control of the issuer; or
(3) If the management has at the security holder's request included a proposal in
its proxy statement and form of proxy relating to either of the last two annual meetings
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also recently released for public comment proposed revisions of rule
3
14a-8 which would expand the number of exceptions to thirteen.'
As its substantive law governing shareholder proposals grew, the
SEC found it necessary to adopt rules establishing a procedure for
determining when it would bring an enforcement action if management
refused to include a shareholder's proposal in the proxy materials on
the grounds that the proposal came under one of the exceptions of rule
14a-8(c). Under this procedure, management, when it believes a pro-

posal is of a type that may legally be omitted, is required to file with
the SEC a copy of the shareholder's proposal, his supporting statement,
a statement of reasons why management believes that the omission of

the proposal is proper, and, if these reasons are based on a matter of
law, the supporting opinion of counsel. 1 4 The burden of proof is on
management to establish that a particular shareholder's proposal is not
a proper one for inclusion in management's proxy materials. 5
When a dispute over the omission of a shareholder's proposal is
submitted to the SEC, it is initially considered by the Division of Corporate Finance."' The shareholder is permitted to file his arguments
of security holders or any special meeting held subsequent to the earlier of such two
annual meetings and such security holder has failed without good causes to present the
proposal, in person or by proxy, for action at the meeting; or
(4) If substantially the same proposal has previously been submitted to security
holders in the management's proxy statement and form of proxy relating to any annual
or special meeting of security holders held within the preceding 5 calendar years, it may
be omitted from the management's proxy material relating to any meeting of security
holders held within the 3 calendar years after the latest such previous submission: Provided, That(i) If the proposal was submitted at only one meeting during such preceding period, it received less than 3 percent of the total number of votes cast in regard thereto;
or
(ii)
If the proposal was submitted at only two meetings during such preceding period, it received at the time of its second submission less than 6 percent of the total
number of votes cast in regard thereto; or
(iii) If the proposal was submitted at three or more meetings during such preceding period, it received at the time of its latest submission less than 10 percent of the
total number of votes cast in regard thereto; or
(5)
If the proposal consists of a recommendation or request that the management
take action with respect to a matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary business operations of the issuer." Id.
13. Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 12598 (July
7, 1976), [Current] CCH FED. SFC. L. REP.
80,634 [hereinafter cited as Proposed
Amendments].
14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d) (1974).
15. 19 Fed. Reg. 246 (1954).
16. 17 C.F.R. § 200.18 (1974).
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in favor of including his proposal, although there is no explicit provision
in the proxy rules for shareholder participation. 1 . The staff evaluates
the arguments submitted by the shareholder and the company and
decides whether or not to recommend enforcement action to the commission. If the staff decides not to recommend enforcement, the
practice has been to notify the management in a terse "no-action" letter
which does not illuminate the reasoning behind the determination.
The staff recommendation may be appealed to the commission by the
protesting shareholder, but review by the commission is discretionary.' 8
The SEC has given its official view of shareholder proposal noaction letters and the shareholder proposal review process in its Statement of Informal Procedures for the Rendering of Staff Advice with
Respect to Shareholder Proposals.'9 The SEC emphasizes that its staff
must review a large number of proxy materials each year. 20 Given the
limited size of its staff and the need for rapid examination, the staff
cannot subject the proxy materials to a detailed analysis. 21 Consequently, the review process itself is informal and the commission and
its staff do not purport to issue rulings or decisions which definitively
determine whether particular proxy material complies with the proxy
rules. 22 No-action letters and letters of comment are issued solely to
provide guidance as to the staff's enforcement views to assist management and proponents in complying with the proxy rules. 23 Neither the
shareholder nor management is bound by the agency's advice.24 The
shareholder is free to bring a private action to force management to
include his proposal even though the SEC has indicated that it will take
no action if the proposal is omitted from the proxy materials. 25
17.
18.
19.

See Proposed Amendments, supra note 13, 80,635, at 86,605.
See 17 C.F.R. § 202.1(d) (1974); Kixmiller v. SEC, 492 F.2d at 641, 645.
Exchange Act Release No. 12,599 (July 7, 1976), [Current] CCH FED. SEc.
L. REP. 1 80,635, at 86,602-06 [hereinafter cited as Statement of Informal Procedures].
20. Id. at 86,604. The agency states that it reviewed 6,700 proxy statements in
fiscal 1974 as a basis for asserting that its shareholder proposal no-action letters are
merely advisory and not a definitive determination of whether a particular filing complied with the proxy rules. Actually, only 161 proposals were omitted from the proxy
statements of 71 companies. One of the most common grounds for omission was that
the proposals were not submitted in time. Consequently, the SEC staff does have time
to analyze adequately whether management has a legal right to omit a shareholder proposal under the proxy rules. See 40 SEC ANN. REP. 33 (1974).
21. Statement of Informal Procedures supra note 19 at 86,604.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 86,605.
24. Id. at 86,604.
25. Id.
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The Statement of Informal Procedures must be viewed in
perspective. The SEC is attempting to preclude direct judicial review
of shareholder proposal no-action determinations by stressing the informal aspects of the review process and by minimizing the legal impact
of the no-action determination. As will be explained in greater detail,
the SEC is correct in characterizing the no-action letters as informal
administrative action lacking in legal effect.2 6 But the SEC completely
disregards the practical effects of a no-action determination. 27 The noaction letter is more than informal advice on the agency's enforcement
position. More important, the no-action letter embodies a decision on
the agency's part not to intervene in the proxy dispute on the shareholder's side. By deciding to remain neutral, the agency in fact
reinforces the management's resolve to omit the proposal. The practical effects of the enforcement decision justify judicial review.
B. Direct Review of Shareholder Proposal No-Action Letters
1. Direct Review in the Court of Appeals
Before the District of Columbia Circuit's decision in Medical
Committee,2" it was generally assumed that SEC no-action letters,
issued in connection with the omission of a shareholder proposal from
management's proxy materials, were not reviewable in the courts.29
No-action letters were thought to be unreviewable because they were
characterized as informal advice rather than formal orders. The sole
review provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, section 25,
limits direct review in the court of appeals to commission "orders" and
rules promulgated under certain enumerated sections of the title. 30
26.
27.
28.
29.
Rules by

See notes 94-107 & accompanying text infra.
See notes 243-72 & accompanying text infra.
432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
Aranow & Einhorn, Corporate Proxy Contests: Enforcement of SEC Proxy
the Commission and Private Parties, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 875, 886 (1956);

Clusserath, The Amended Stockholder ProposalRule: A Decade Later, 40 NoTRE
LAW. 13, 17 (1964).

DAME

30. 15 U.S.C. § 78y (Supp. V, 1975).
In its 1975 amendment to section 25 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Con-

gress made changes regarding direct review in the court of appeals. Section 25(a),
which deals with direct review of commission orders, was changed with the intention
of merely codifying existing law rather than altering "the availability of Court review
of orders or the manner in which such review is exercised." S. REP. No. 94-75, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). For this reason, section 25(a) is dealt with herein as it has
been interpreted in the courts in the past, though the language is new.
Section 25(b), as amended, gives the right of direct review in the court of appeals
of any rule promulgated under sections 6, 11, 11A, 15(c)(5)-(6), 15A, 17, 17A or 19

of the Securities Exchange Act, i.e., "any provision directly relating to the operation or
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In 1969, the Medical Committee for Human Rights proposed an
amendment to the corporate charter of Dow Chemical Company which
would have prohibited the company from manufacturing napalm. Dow
refused to include the proposal in its proxy materials. The SEC staff
recommended that no enforcement action be taken by the commission
to compel Dow to include the proposal, and the commission affirmed
the staff's determination. The Medical Committee then appealed to
the court of appeals under section 25 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act.
Section 25(a) provides: "A person aggrieved by a final order of the
Commission entered pursuant to this chapter may obtain review of the
order in the United States Court of Appeals.. .. "I'
The critical jurisdictional issue was whether the action by the
commission in approving the staff recommendation that no action be
taken against Dow Chemical was an "order" within the meaning of section 25(a).12 In ruling that the no-action determination was indeed
such an order, the court in Medical Committee made two findings: (1)
that the no-action determination by the SEC operated with final effect
on the Medical Committee;"3 and (2) that the informal procedure
under which the recommendation was reached embodied the essence
of a formal quasi-judicial proceeding. 4 The court emphasized that
judicial review depended on an initial determination by the SEC to
review the staff recommendation of no action.3 5
Four years later, in Kixmiller v. SEC,3 6 the same court of appeals
refused to find jurisdiction under section 25(a) where the SEC had
refused to review its staff's no-action determination regarding a shareholder proposal. The court followed the Medical Committee distinction between commission and staff action and held that a staff no-action
was not a
recommendation which the commission refused to 3review
7
appeals.
of
court
the
in
reviewable
"order"
commission
Kixmiller can be viewed in either of two ways. It can be interpreted as a narrow application of the Medical Committee principle that
regulation of the national market system, a national clearing system, or the SEC's overSince the rules regarding shareholder
sight of the self-regulatory organizations."
proposals were promulgated under section 14 of the act, section 25(b), as amended, has
no effect on this article. Therefore, all discussion of direct review in the court of ap-

peals will focus on the section 25(a) requirement that a commission "order" be involved.
31.
32.

15 U.S.C. § 78y (Supp. V, 1975).
432 F.2d 659, 665.

33. Id. at 667.
34. Id. at 670.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 675.
492 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Id. at 644.
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only commission no-action determinations are reviewable as orders in
the court of appeals. On the other hand, there are indications in the
Kixmiller opinion that, since Medical Committee, the District of Columbia Circuit has altered its view of the shareholder proposal review
process and the legal impact of shareholder proposal no-action
determinations.
In Kixmiller, the court stresses the informal nature of the review
38
process and the fact that the no-action recommendation is advisory.
In Medical Committee, however, the court emphasizes the formality of
the shareholder proposal review process at the staff level 9 and specifically contrasted the no-action determination with informal advice. The
court stated that the SEC was formally deciding among adversary claims
premised on legal arguments. 4 This conceptualization of -the shareholder proposal review process as embodying the essence of a formal
adversarial hearing was vital to the Medical Committee holding because
the court maintained that the formal evidentiary proceeding required
on the face of section 25(a) could be dispensed with if the informal
procedure employed incorporated the fundamental adversarial features
of a formal hearing. 41 The Kixmiller characterization of the staff
review process as informal subverts the Medical Committee finding that
the shareholder proposal review process is the functional equivalent of
a formal proceeding.
The Kixmiller court also found to be minimal the adverse legal
impact of the no-action determination which Medical Committee had
used to support its finding that such a determination constituted an
"order" under section 25(a). The Medical Committee court reasoned
that a no-action determination had the effect of an "order" because the
deference paid a commission no-action determination impaired the
shareholder's private action against the company.4 2 In contrast with its
38. "The Commission offers informal advice by its staff on a vast number of
proxy solicitations." Id. at 645.
39. 432 F.2d 659, 668-72. See Note, Medical Committee for Human Rights v.
SEC: Judicial Review of SEC No-Action Determinations Under the Proxy Rules, 57

VA. L. Rnv. 331, 339 (1971) [hereinafter cited as JudicialReview of SEC].
40. "The courts, we think, are abundantly capable of distinguishing between situations in which an agency gives informal advice and situations in which it formally decides among conflicting adversary claims premised on detailed legal arguments." 432
F.2d at 675.
41. The 1975 amendments have removed the explicit requirement of a proceeding
from section 25(a). See note 30 supra. The amendments bring the statutory language
in line with the numerous exceptions to that requirement which cases like Medical Committee have developed.
42. 432 F.2d at 666-68.
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earlier decision, the court in Kixmiller saw the shareholder's private
action in -the district court as a viable option notwithstanding the staff's
no-action determination.4" Finally, Medical Committee found that the
proposing shareholder was aggrieved because he had been coerced by
the exhaustion doctrine into participating in the proceeding before the
agency and, consequently, his recourse to an authoritative judicial
determination on the merits had been delayed. 44 In Kixmiller, however the court stated that the shareholder can bypass the administrative process entirely.4 5 Since the propriety of direct review of the noaction determination and the choice of reviewing courts hinges on the
nature and effects of the no-action determinations, much of this article
will be devoted to assessing the accuracy of the competing perceptions
of shareholder proposal no-action determinations.
Kixmiller exposes weaknesses in the Medical Committee's factual
arguments. There are, however, also weaknesses in Medical Committee's legal analysis which are much more important in terms of direct
judicial review of informal agency action. The type of reasoning which
the Medical Committee court employs to justify review of informal noaction determinations in the court of appeals as orders can be used to
justify the review of informal actions in the court of appeals in other
areas of administrative law which have review provisions similar to section 25(a) of the Securities Exchange Act. Since Medical Committee
has been vacated as moot by the Supreme Court, the lower courts are
free to re-evaluate whether informal action should be reviewable in the
court of appeals. The second part of this article discusses the theoretical and practical shortcomings of the Medical Committee analysis. In
the author's view, direct judicial review of shareholder proposal noaction determinations and informal administrative action generally
should be restricted to the district courts under the APA.
2. Direct Review in the District Courts Under the Administrative
ProcedureAct
a. Action by the SEC Itself
In 1970 when Medical Committee was decided, the courts
routinely held that informal agency action, including no-action letters
and interpretive opinions, was not ripe for direct review under the
43. 492 F.2d at 645-46.
44. 432 F.2d at 667.
45. 492 F.2d at 645-46.
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Administrative Procedure Act,4 6 the provisions of which guarantee judicial scrutiny of any "final agency action. '417 In Medical Committee, the
reviewability issue was framed as if the court had to choose between
direct review in the court of appeals under section 25(a) or no judicial
review at all."' In the last few years, however, the courts have abandoned the view that informal advisory opinions are unripe for judicial
review. Shortly after Medical Committee, the District of Columbia Cir49
cuit, in National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz,
held that an informal interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
issued by the Wage and Hour Administrator of the Department of
Labor in response to inquiries from a trade association, was ripe for
review under the APA. In Independent Broker-Dealers Trade Association v. SEC,50 the same court held that informal SEC action of a different sort was reviewable under the APA. In that case, the plaintiffs
were seeking review of a letter from the head of the SEC pressuring
the New York Stock Exchange to abolish customer-directed "give-ups"
of broker fees. In finding that review was warranted, the court emphasized that the practical effects of the letter established the jurisdiction
of the district court. Subsequently, in Potomac Federal Corporationv.
SEC,51 a federal district court held that a staff action letter which the
SEC approved was reviewable under the APA. A commission shareholder proposal no-action letter fits squarely under these decisions and
therefore ought to be reviewable under the APA.
b. Action by the SEC Staff
National Automatic Laundry,"2 however, created a dichotomy
46. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 151 (1967); Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 402 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Richfield
Oil Corp. v. United States, 207 F.2d 864, (9th Cir. 1953); Hearst Radio, Inc. v. FCC,
167 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1948); West v. Bank of Commerce & Trusts, 153 F.2d 566
(4th Cir. 1946); Helco Prods. v. McNutt, 137 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Midwest
Coast Transport v. United States, 125 F. Supp. 557 (D.S.D. 1954); F.W. Maurer & Sons
v. Andrews, 30 F. Supp. 637 (E.D. Pa. 1937); cf. Public Util. Comm'n v. United Air
Lines, 346 U.S. 402 (1953). Florsheim v. Weinburger, 346 F. Supp. 950, 956-57
(D.D.C. 1972). See generally, 3 DAvs, supra note 6, § 21.09.
47. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(13), 702, 704 (1970).
48. The court stated, "Viewing the proxy rules in this light, we see no substantial
reason why the absence of formal adjudicatory hearings in the regulatory scheme should
render Commission decisions, however, capricious or erroneous, utterly immune to direct
judicial review or redress." 432 F.2d at 671.
49. 443 F.2d 689 (D.C.Cir. 1971).
50. 442 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
51. [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Sc. L. RaP. 1 94,704 (D.D.C. 1974).
52. 443 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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between informal action by the head of an agency, which is presumptively ripe for direct review, and staff action, which is not. The court
did not consider the possibility that informal staff action which the head
of an agency refused to review might be ripe for judicial review. In
Potomac Federal Corporation,53 the court stated flatly, albeit in dictum,
that a staff opinion letter which the commission refused to review would
not be subject to judicial review. Finally, in Koss v. SEC,54 a district
court held unreviewable under the APA a request by the SEC staff that
the plaintiff broker-dealer inform issuers of any Regulation A5 5 offering
naming him as the underwriter that he was under investigation and that
if he were suspended, the Regulation A exemption might be lost. The
court based its decision that the staff action was not ripe for review on
the ground that the request did not represent the opinion of the SEC
itself and that the SEC did not appear reluctant to oversee its staff
activities. The sensitivity to the practical effect of the agency action
on the plaintiff which the District .of Columbia Circuit displayed in
Independent Broker-Dealers was lacking in Koss. On the basis of
these decisions, then, it would appear that staff shareholder proposal
no-action letters which the SEC refuses to review are unreviewable in
the courts under the APA.
It seems logical, however, that the quality of administrative
decisionmaking is best at the highest level of an administrative agency
and decreases as one travels down the ranks of the bureaucracy. Conversely, the need for supervision to ensure that informal administrative
action comports with the law is greatest at the staff level. A rule which
precludes judicial review when the head of an agency refuses to
examine informal staff action immunizes arbitrariness and abuse at the
staff level from public scrutiny. The third part of this article will present the argument that the standard ripeness methodology outlined in
5 should be
Abbott Laboratoriesv. Gardner
applied to informal administrative action at both the staff and head of the agency levels. Informal staff action which imposes hardships should be reviewable at the
insistence of the affected persons unless the costs imposed on the agency
outweigh the harm -to the plaintiff. In particular, this article takes the
position that staff shareholder proposal no-action determinations are
ripe for review in the district courts under the Administrative Procedure
Act.
53. [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH Fa. SEc. L. REP.
54. 364 F. Supp. 1321 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
55. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-263 (1976).
56. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).

94,704 (D.D.C. 1974).
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II. Informal Administrative Action Should Be Reviewed
in the District Courts Under the Administrative
Procedure Act, Not in the Court of Appeals
Under Statutory Review Provisions
The Medical Committee decision57 held that informal administrative action by the head of an agency is reviewable in the court of
appeals under a statutory review provision pertaining to review of
formal administrative orders. 58 A similar statutory review provision is
contained in many of the administrative statutes. 59 The court's intentions were good, but its analysis of the statutory review provision is tortured. For the theoretical and practical reasons outlined below, direct
judicial review of informal administrative action should be restricted to
the district courts under the Administrative Procedure Act.
A.

Interpretation of Section 25(a) Prior to Medical Committee

To enable the SEC to discharge its regulatory functions, Congress
delegated authority to the commission in certain specified situations to
conduct formal adjudicative proceedings and to enter binding orders.
For example, the SEC has the power to enter orders suspending or
revoking the registration of broker-dealers, 60 to order that the rules
of a national securities exchange be altered or supplemented, 61 and to
order the withdrawal of the registration of a security. 62 The orders of
the SEC conclusively determine the rights of the affected parties, subject to judicial review.63
Section 25(a) is coordinated with the provisions of the act which
authorizes the SEC to enter binding orders. Section 25(a) requires
that three conditions be satisfied before commission action is reviewable in the court of appeals. 64 The commission action must be (1)
a final order issued by the SEC (2) entered pursuant to the proceed57. 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
58. See notes 27-35 & accompanying text supra.
59. See note 6 supra.
60. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 780 (1970), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 780 (Supp. V, 1975).
61. Id. § 19b, 15 U.S.C. § 78s (Supp. V, 1975).
62. Id.§ 19a(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78s (Supp. V, 1975).
63. Cf. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442, 460-64 (1960); SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943); Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d 260, 263-64 (D.C.
Cir. 1962); Associated Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 293 F.2d 738, 740 (10th Cir. 1961). See
also United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Corp., 384 U.S. 394, 421-22 (1966).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1) (Supp. V, 1975).
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ings required by the chapter; 65 and the appellant must be a person who
is (3) aggrieved by the order. Since the act itself provides that the
SEC must afford notice and a hearing before entering an order,6 6 a
formal order automatically qualifies for section 25(a) review.
Early cases applied section 25(a) literally, holding that only orders
entered on the merits after a formal statutory proceeding were reviewable in the court of appeals. 67 This mechanical approach was relaxed
in American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. SEC,6" which focused on the

effect of SEC action on the complainant.

The court dispensed with

absolute insistence on the procedural prerequisites of an evidentiary

hearing, since the action taken was the equivalent of a statutory order.
American Sumatra established the rule that when SEC action "operates

particularly rather than generally-with a judgment entered on a state
of facts and affecting only one person" the action is reviewable in the
court of appeals, notwithstanding the commission's failure to afford the

complainant a formal adversary hearing.69 For purposes of statutory
review under section 25, the effect of the determination, not the nature
of the proceedings, governs the availability of direct review in the court

of appeals. 70
65. After the 1975 amendments, this requirement no longer appears in the language of section 25(a), although Congress has stated that it intended no more than to
bring the language of section 25(a) in line with the case law interpreting it. See note
30 supra.
66. 15 U.S.C. § 78w(c) (Supp. V, 1975).
67. See Wallach v. SEC, 206 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (party requirement);
Guaranty Underwriters v. SEC, 131 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1942) (final order requirement);
Resources Corp. Int'l v. SEC, 97 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1938) (final order requirement); SEC v. Andrews, 88 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1937) (final order requirement); Third
Ave. Ry. v. SEC, 85 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1936) (proceeding requirement); cf. Stardust,
Inc. v. SEC, 225 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1955) (aggrieved party requirement); Crooker v.
SEC, 161 F.2d 944 (1st Cir. 1947) (aggrieved party requirement).
68. 93 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
69. Id. at 239 (emphasis added). A year later the same court restated its holding
in American Sumatra as follows: "We held in the Sumatra Case that the order of the
Commission might be subjected to review even though no hearing was held and no findings made to support the order, on the theory that under the circumstances of that case
it was the duty of the Commission to hold a hearing and make findings." Mallory Coal
Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Comm'n, 99 F.2d 339, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
70. The District of Columbia Circuit also noted in Mallory that an agency could
not transform an unreviewable action into a reviewable order merely by holding a formal
hearing where the circumstances did not call for such a procedure: "In the same way,
the action of such an agency in holding a hearing and making findings, under circumstances which do not call for such procedure, will not give a resulting order reviewable
character, when otherwise it would not be subject to review." Id. Consequently, the
emphasis which the Medical Committee opinion placed on the adversary aspects of the
shareholder proposal review process is irrelevant, as a shareholder proposal no-action determination is not a statutory order within the ambit of section 25(a).
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Judged by the pre-Medical Committee cases, a shareholder
proposal no-action letter would seem an unlikely candidate for section
25(a) review. The Securities Exchange Act delegates power to the
SEC to regulate the proxy solicitation process by commission rules and
regulations."l The SEC, however, is not given authority to enter orders
governing the content of proxy materials. This omission of the power
to issue orders is in marked contrast to the SEC's authority under the
Securities Act of 1933 to issue stop orders barring the distribution of
misleading prospectuses7 2 and its express power under the Public Utility Holding Company Act to regulate proxies by order.73 When it
determines that a shareholder's statement should be included in the
management's proxy materials, the SEC must bring an enforcement
action in the district court. 4 The legislative history of the Securities
Exchange Act reveals that Congress weighed the impact of direct judicial review on the exercise of SEC functions when it determined which
functions would be performed by rule, which by order, and which the
SEC would have the option to perform by either rule or order.7 5 Since
the Congress did not empower the SEC to order companies to include
shareholder proposals, commentators prior to Medical Committee
thought that SEC shareholder proposal no-action determinations were
76
unreviewable under section 25(a).
71. Section 14(a) of the act provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person, by
the use of the mails or by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of

any facility of a national securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the pub-

lic interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name
to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security . . . registered
pursuant to section 781 of this title." 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
72. Securities Act of 1933 § 8(d), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d) (1970).
73. Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 § llk(3), 15 U.S.C. § 79k
(g)(3) (1970).
74. See Aranow & Einhor, Corporate Proxy Contests: Enforcement of SEC
Proxy Rules by the Commission and Private Parties, 31 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 875, 876-883
(1956). See generally Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules in the Courts, 73 H-Iv. L. REv. 1041

(1960).
75. See PBW Stock Exchange, Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718, 723-26 (3d Cir. 1973).
76. See 3 Loss, supra note 11, at 1926; Aranow & Einhorn, Corporate Proxy Contests: Enforcement of SEC Proxy Rules by the Commission and Private Parties, 31
N.Y.U.L. REv. 875, 886 (1956); Note, The SEC and "No-Action" Decisions Under
Proxy Rule 14a-8: The Case for Direct Judicial Review, 84 HARV. L. RFv. 835, 858
(1971) [hereinafter cited as No-Action Decisions]. One commentator said, "It should

be noted that SEC action under Rule 14a-8 is not, except in a few rare cases [under
the Public Utility Holding Company Act], a formal administrative adjudicatory order
within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act. Rather these decisions must
be understood in their context as informal administrative determinations not directly

subject to review by Courts of Appeals."

Clusserath, The Amended Stockholder Pro-
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B. The Shortcomings in the Medical Committee Analysis of the
Breadth of Section 25(a)
Because shareholder proposal no-action determinations did not fall

within the ambit of section 25(a) as it was then construed, the Medical
Committee court resorted to general principles of judicial review and
analogies to buttress its conclusion that the no-action letters were
reviewable. 77 The opinion formulated new standards for determining
whether section 25(a) was applicable without explaining why the
established standards were inadequate. The court ignored the fact that
earlier cases required the SEC to enter a formal quasi-judicial order
under the authority conferred by the Securities Exchange Act before
section 25(a) review was permitted.
Using a survey of numerous cases and commentaries on reviewability, the Medical Committee court found that two general factors
determine whether a particular action is a reviewable order. 8 First,
the action must operate "with final effect upon a particular individual,
entity, or group.179 Second, the proceedings at which the proposed
action is considered must be characterized by some degree of formality. 0
Because the court found that the shareholder proposal review process
embodied the fundamental characteristics of an adversary hearing, and
because the no-action determination could be classified as an order,
the court held that it had jurisdiction to review the SEC's determination
under section 25 (a).
1.

The Medical Committee OrderAnalysis

The test which Medical Committee adopted for a reviewable order
is inappropriate for section 25(a). The opinion states that an administrative action is a reviewable "order" if it operates with "final effect
upon a particular individual, entity or group."'" The cases and authorities which are cited for this proposition,"8 2 however, are concerned with
review under more liberal statutory review provisions.8 3 In contrast,
posal Rule: A Decade Later, 40 NOTRE DAME I.wW. 13, 17 (1964) (emphasis in original).
77. 432 F.2d 659, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 667.
81. Id. at 666.
82. The court cited Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967);
Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 51, 55, cert. denied, 347 U.S. 990 (1954);
L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMnmsTRATIvE ACMTON 358, 403-04 (1965) [hereinafter cited as JA-FP].
83. One of the earliest of review statutes, and an example of one more liberal than
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section 25(a) limits appellate jurisdiction to "orders" 84 entered pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act.85 The interaction between section

25(a), the other provisions of the Securities Exchange Act which provide that the SEC will proceed by "order," and the prior case law con-

struing section 25(a) discussed previously, establish that section 25(a)
is limited to quasi-judicial orders, that is, to instances where the SEC
pursuant to authority delegated in the act applies a statutory standard
to a set of facts and enters an order which has the same effect as a
86
lower court judgment.

The court also attempted to support its conclusion that a no-action
determination is a section 25(a) order by citing Rochester Telephone
Corp. v. United States.87 Medical Committee suggests that Rochester
section 25(a), is the Urgent Deficiencies Act (UDA), 38 Stat. 219 (1913), 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1336, 1398 (1970).
The relatively liberal statutory review provisions used
by the courts in the cases cited by the Medical Committee court can be traced back to
the UDA. The UDA provides that suits to enforce, enjoin, set aside, annul or suspend,
in whole or in part, any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission must be brought
in a three-judge district court. As construed in the courts, the UDA (and UDA-type
statutes) embraces a broad range of administrative actions which are characterized by
a degree of formality and which "impose an obligation, deny a right or fix some legal
relationship as a consummation of the administrative process." Chicago & S. Air Lines
v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948). See Isbrandtsen Co. v. United
States, 211 F.2d 51, 55, cert. denied, 347 U.S. 990 (1954). For a more detailed discussion of the UDA see 3 DAvis, supra note 6, § 23.03; JAFFE, supra note 82, at 157-59.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a) (1) (Supp. V, 1975). Section 25(a) contemplates a formal trial-type hearing which culminates in an order. The section stipulates that the
commission shall file with the court of appeals the record on which the order complained
of is entered (Id. § 78y(a) (2)); that no objection shall be urged before the court that
was not first urged before the commission (Id. § 78y(c) (1)); and that findings of fact
of the commission are binding on the courts if they are supported by substantial evidence
(Id. § 78y(a) (4)).
85. "But a statute which provides for review of an 'order' following a stated course
of procedure will preclude the statutory review of the action qua 'order' where the stated
administrative process has not been completed or is not a prelude to the action in question."

JAFFE, supra note 82, at 418.

86. In one case, the court stated, "Congress has undertaken to provide within the
Securities Exchange Act the machinery by which judicial orders of the Commission may
be reviewed." American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 93 F.2d 236, 239
(D.C. Cir. 1937). See also United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 181
F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827 (1950); cf. Federal Power Comm'n
v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U.S. 375, 384 (1938); Watson v. National Trans. Safety
Bd., 513 F.2d 1081, 1082 (9th Cir. 1975); Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 476 F.2d 142, 147 (5th Cir. 1973); Division of Prod., Am. Petroleum Inst.
v. Halaby, 307 F.2d 363, 365 (5th Cir. 1962); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 236 F.2d 785 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 968 (1956); Philadelphia Co. v. SEC, 164 F.2d 889 (D.C. Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 828 (1948);
Standard Fruit & S.S. Co. v. Midwest Stock Exch., 178 F. Supp. 669, 675 (N.D. Ill.
1959).
87. 307 U.S. 125 (1939). In Rochester, the Federal Communications Commis-
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is authority for finding that a shareholder proposal na-action decision

is a section 25(a) order, for "that case, like the present controversy,
involved a petitioner's attempt to obtain judicial review of 'action by the
Commission which affects the complainant because it does not forbid
or compel conduct with reference to him by a third person.' "88 But
the Medical Committee court took this language, which is dictum
describing a certain kind of 'negative order' traditionally found unre-

viewable, quite out of context. Rochester can be cited fairly for the
proposition that whether agency action is positive or negative in character is irrelevant for purposes of review, but Rochester does not support
a finding that a no-action determination is a section 25(a) order.89
Although the Medical Committee court relied on cases decided

under more liberal statutory review provisions than section 25(a),10 the
court still had to distort the nature and effects of the no-action determination even to satisfy these less restrictive requirements. The court
cited three reasons why the shareholder was aggrieved by the SEC's

no-action determination.

First, the shareholder had to participate in

the review process before the SEC or run the risk that the district court

would dismiss his private action against the company on the ground
that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. 9 ' There is, however, considerable doubt that a shareholder is required to exhaust SEC
administrative remedies before he can bring a private action against a
company.9 2 The assertion that a shareholder is forced to participate in
the administrative proceedings rests tenuously on one district court
case.9 3 There is no formal provision in the SEC rules for shareholder

participation in the review process, and there is no real need for it. The
sion ordered all telephone carriers subject to the Communications Act to file schedules
of their charges and other information with the agency. Rochester refused to comply
with the order on the ground that it was exempt from the act. The FCC entered an
order classifying Rochester as "subject to all common carrier provisions of the Communications Act of 1934, and, therefore, subject to all orders of the Telephone Division."
Id. at 128. The Supreme Court held that the classification and implied refusal to find
an exemption was a reviewable order. The Court observed that the FCC ruling "necessarily and immediately carried directions of obedience to previously formulated mandatory order. . . ." Id. at 143-44.
88. 432 F.2d at 668, quoting Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125,
135 (1939).
89. See Note, SEC DeterminationsNot to Enforce Its Shareholder Proposal Rule
Held Subject to Judicial Review, 71 CoLUM. L. RPv. 344, 351 (1971).
90. See note 83 & accompanying text supra.
91. 432 F.2d at 667.
92. See Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules in the Courts, 73 HAv. L. REv. 1041, 1064
(1960); JudicialReview of SEC, supra note 39, at 337.
93. See Peck v. Greyhound Corp., 97 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 28

commission makes its own decision whether or not it will bring an action to enforce its proxy rules when a company's management files its
reasons for excluding a shareholder proposal. Finally, Kixmiller undercuts the exhaustion argument by declaring that the shareholder can
94
bypass the administrative process completely.
Second, the Medical Committee opinion relies heavily on the
proposition that a shareholder's private right of action against a company for violation of the proxy rules is inadequate because the court
in the private action will defer to the commission's no-action determination. 95 Since a shareholder's private action is supposedly impaired by
the no-action letter, the court concludes that the no-action letter operates with final effect on the shareholder's rights and is therefore reviewable as an order. 6 This argument, however, is suspect. The SEC
does not give detailed reasons for its no-action decisions, 97 and it expressly disclaims in the body of its no-action letters that it has adjudicated the merits of the dispute; 98 the court in the private action, therefore, has no basis for deferring to a no-action letter. 9 Language such
94. 492 F.2d 641, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
95. The courts have in the past given such judicial deference to SEC no-action
letters. See, e.g., Brooks v. Standard Oil Co., 308 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Union
Pac. R.R. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill. 1964); Curtin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 124 F. Supp. 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
96. 432 F.2d at 667-68.
97. See Lockhart, SEC No-Action Letters: Informal Advice as a Discretionary
Administrative Clearance, 37 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 95, 120 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Lockhart]; No-Action Decisions,supra note 76, at 843.
98. "While Rule 14a-8(d) does not provide for any communications from shareholders to the Commission's staff, the staff, of course, will always consider information
concerning alleged violations of the statutes administered by the Commission and this
may include argument as to why it is believed that activities proposed to be taken would
be violative of the statute or rule involved. The receipt of such information or argument, however, is not to be construed as changing the staff's informal investigatory procedures and proxy review into a formal or adversary procedure. The enforcement judgment that the staff has reached does not and cannot purport to 'adjudicate' the merits
of the company's posture in this matter. Only a district court can decide whether the
company is obligated to include the instant proposal in its proxy materials." See Letter from Peter J. Romeo, Attorney on the SEC staff, to Melvin L. Bedrick, Counsel for
the Washington Post Co., Mar. 1975, in Appendix to Petition for Review, Kixmiller
v. SEC, 492 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
99. See Statement of Informal Procedures, supra note 19, at 86,604-05. Of 895
proposals which were successfully excluded from proxy statements from fiscal 1956
through 1969, only 3 were privately contested in the district courts. In each of these
3 cases the shareholder lost because the court improperly placed weight on the commission's no-action determination. Note, SEC Determinations Not to Enforce Its Shareholder ProposalRule Held Subject to Judicial Review, 71 CoLUms. L. REv. 344, 348.
The proper method, however, for rectifying the district court's mistaken deference
to commission no-action determinations and for effectuating the shareholder's private action is to pursue the district court's decision in the private action to the court of appeals
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as "judicial deference" would be appropriate if a shareholder's remedy
were exclusively in the SEC. But it is clear that the only remedy,
whether sought by the shareholder independently or by the SEC on the
shareholder's behalf, is in the courts. No SEC decision affecting the
rights of the parties is involved in a no-action determination. The SEC
has merely decided not to pursue the protection of the shareholder's
rights in the courts. Section 26 of the Securities Exchange Act' and
rule 14a-9,' 0 for instance, state that SEC examination of proxy material
filed with it is not to be deemed a finding by the commission that the
material is accurate or complete. Consequently, no legal inference can
properly be drawn from the fact that the SEC has decided to accept
a company's statement justifying its decision to exclude a shareholder's
proposal. 0 2
Finally, as a third reason why the shareholder was aggrieved by
the no-action determination, the Medical Committee opinion emphasized that the no-action determination deprived the shareholder of SEC
assistance. 10 3 Although this analysis is true in effect, deprivation of
SEC assistance does not transform the enforcement decision into a
reviewable order. Actions are not even reviewable as orders under
statutory review provisions more liberal than section 25(a) unless
"rights or obligations have been determined or legal consequences will
flow from the agency action."' 0 4 As previously explained,' 1 5 no legal
to reverse the error in deferring to no-action determinations, rather than pursuing direct
review. Direct review is a circuitous method for protecting shareholder's rights. Moreover, there is also the danger that the court in the action for direct review will make
the same mistake of deferring to the no-action determination.
100. 15 U.S.C. § 78z (1970).

101.

See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(b) (1976).

102. A student comment which examined the cases in which the courts allegedly
deferred to SEC no-action letters concluded that the courts paid lipservice to the concept of deference and then reexamined the legal issues on the merits. Judicial Review
of SEC, supra note 39. Even if one assumes for purposes of argument that district
courts will defer to an SEC shareholder proposal no-action determination in a private
action, the appropriate procedure for correcting the district court's error in deferring to
the no-action determination is to appeal the private action to the appellate courts. The
possibility that district courts may pay undue deference to an SEC no-action decision
is not a valid reason for concluding that the no-action determination is reviewable under

section 25(a).
Alternatively, if the District of Columbia Circuit believed in Medical Committee
that a no-action determination should be deferred to in a private action, there would be
little advantage in allowing the shareholder to invoke section 25(a), since the no-action
determination would be entitled to equal deference in the court of appeals.
103. 432 F.2d at 667.
104. Port of Boston M.T. Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62,
71 (1970).
105. See text accompanying note 102 supra.
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consequences stem from the no-action determination, and the shareholder's rights are not affected by the no-action determination because
he has no legal right to compel the SEC to bring an enforcement ac-

tion.1" 6
order,
2.

Consequently, the enforcement decision is not a reviewable

0 7 even

under more liberal statutory review provisions.

The ProceedingRequirement

The Medical Committee court recognized that section 25(a)
applies only to formal orders and thus was faced with the task of
explaining why section 25(a) should apply to a no-action determination
which was not the product of a formal statutory proceeding. " Initially,
10 8
the court cited Cities Service Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission,'
Phillips Petroleum v. Federal Power Commission,10 9 and Isbrandtsen
Co. v. United States'" for the proposition that the absence of a formal
evidentiary hearing does not compel the conclusion that an administrative decision is unreviewable under statutory review provisions analogous to section 25(a)."' This result is necessary, the court argues,
because agencies are frequently confronted with situations in which
substantial questions of fact, law, or policy may be properly resolved
through procedures less cumbersome than "trial-type" hearings." 2 Although it is undoubtedly correct that the evidentiary hearing requirement is dispensable under some circumstances, the Medical Committee
opinion neglects to state the mitigating circumstances which will permit
judicial review in the absence of the requisite proceeding. Each of the
three cases cited in Medical Committee involved an interim order
entered in advance of a formal hearing in which the final order was
to be issued." 13 There was no doubt that the final order which would
106. See Project on Corporate Responsibility v. SEC, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
93,783 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Dyer v. SEC, 291 F.2d 774, 781
(8th Cir. 1961); Leighton v. SEC, 221 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825
(1955). See generally Stardust, Inc. v. SEC, 225 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1955); Crooker
v. SEC, 161 F.2d 944 (1st Cir. 1947); SEC v. Andrews, 88 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1937).
107. See Judicial Review of SEC, supra note 39, at 338.
108. 255 F.2d 860 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 837 (1958).
109. 227 F.2d 470 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1005 (1956).
110. 211 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 990 (1954).
111. 432 F.2d at 668.
112. Id.
113. In Cities Service, the order which the petitioner sought to have reviewed in
the court of appeals was a Federal Power Commission order under 15 U.S.C. § 717c(c)
(1970), accepting for filing a rate schedule submitted by a natural gas company. The
order had the same practical effect as FPC approval of the filed rates after a statutory
proceeding, since the commission denied the complainants' petition for a rehearing. The
commission had not entered an order after a hearing concerning the lawfulness of the
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be entered in the proceeding was reviewable under the statutory review
provision.11 4 The principal question was whether the interim orders
were ripe for review in light of the principle that interlocutory orders
are unreviewable until the review of the final order.1 15 The courts held
that interim orders were final for the purposes of review if they
imposed an obligation, denied a right, or fixed a legal relationship as
the consummation of the administrative process."" It should be noted
that this test performs two functions: it simultaneously defines what
actions are orders, and determines when agency action is ripe for
review." 7 In Cities Service Gas Co., Phillips Petroleum and Isbrandtsen, this test governed the determination that the interlocutory orders
were ripe for purposes of review, but in determining whether -the interlocutory actions were orders for purposes of statutory review in the
court of appeals, the courts looked to the requirements of the statutory
review provision. The interim orders were determined to be reviewable in the court of appeals as "orders" because they were short-term
equivalents of the final orders which Congress had granted the agency
authority to enter, and which were clearly reviewable under the statutory review provisions."18 The rule that emerges from these three
rates (as it is authorized to do under 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1970)) which would automatically qualify as a final commission order reviewable in the court of appeals. Cities
Service Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 255 F.2d 860 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 837 (1958). In Phillips Petroleum, the petitioners sought judicial review of an
order suspending rate filings until a hearing on the reasonableness of the orders could
be held and a final order entered. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n,
227 F.2d 470 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1005 (1956). Isbrandtsen involved a United States Maritime Commission order which allowed a rate schedule to
go into effect pending hearings which were to be held on the rate schedule. Isbrandtsen
Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 990 (1954).
114. Natural Gas Act of 1938, § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1970). A final
order of the Maritime Commission is reviewable in the court of appeals under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2342(3) (1970).
115. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U.S. 375, 384
(1938).
116. See Cities Service Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 255 F.2d 860, 863
(10th Cir.) cert. denied, 358 U.S. 837 (1958); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 227 F.2d 470, 474 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1005 (1956); Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 51, 55 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 990
(1954).
117.

See JAFFE, supra note 82, at 419.

118. In Phillips Petroleum the court stated: "Inany event, the legal consequences
which attach to these orders have conclusive effect upon the rights and duties of Phillips as an independent producer under the Natural Gas Act and they are therefore reviewable." 227 F.2d at 475. Similarly, in Isbrandtsen the court noted: '"The Board's
action was just as determinative of Isbrandtsen's rights as it would have been had the
Board specifically and affirmatively approved the dual rate system agreement in accordance with the statutory requirements ... ." 211 F.2d at 56.
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cases is that the court of appeals has jurisdiction, even though an
agency has not held an evidentiary hearing or entered a final order
on the merits, where: (1) an interim order is entered in advance of
the evidentiary hearing which will result in the entry of a final order,
and the interim order is the short-term equivalent of a final order; 9
(2) the agency has decided that it is more efficient to enter an order
without a formal evidentiary hearing; 12° or (3) the agency is attempting
to preclude statutory review by refusing to conform to the hearing
requirements enunciated in the statutory review provision. 12
The
three cases stand for the proposition that it is the nature of the order
rather than the process by which the order is entered which determines
whether the court of appeals has jurisdiction under section 25(a) or
a related statutory review provision. The observation in Medical
Committee that an evidentiary hearing is not an absolute prerequisite
for section 25(a) review is accurate then, but reliance on the Cities
Service, Phillips Petroleum, and Isbrandtsen cases is misplaced. Noaction determinations cannot be construed as binding quasi-judicial
orders within the contemplation of section 25(a), and therefore do not
come within the rule of these cases.' 2 2
After noting that the failure to hold an evidentiary hearing does
not necessarily bar section 25(a) review, the Medical Committee court
attempts to demonstrate that a formal hearing would be superfluous.
It states that the SEC utilizes an informal procedure which preserves
the essential features of a formal proceeding to consider proxy filings."' The opinion emphasizes that the elaborate rules which set
forth a proposing shareholder's procedural and substantive rights incorporate the essence of an adversary encounter. 24 For instance, management is required to file a statement of its reasons for excluding a shareholder's proposal thirty days before the date the preliminary copies of
the proxy materials are filed.' 2 5 If the company relies on legal grounds
119. See Cities Service Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 255 F.2d 860 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 837 (1958); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 227 F.2d 470 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1005 (1956); Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 990 (1954).
120. See Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 688 (D.C. Cir.
1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).

121. See Cities Service Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 255 F.2d 860, 863
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 837 (1958).
122.
123.
124.

See notes 81-107 & accompanying text supra.
432 F.2d at 669-70.
Id. at 670.

125.

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d) (1976).
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for excluding the proposal, it must file supporting opinions of counsel. 126 Copies of the management's filings must be sent to the proposing shareholder. 127 The shareholder has an opportunity to respond
with detailed legal arguments.128 Finally, the rules place -the burden
of proof on the management to show that the proposal is not a proper
subject for shareholder action. 2 9
The proxy rules governing shareholder proposal no-action letters
are more structured than the procedure associated with ordinary noaction letters. The differences in procedure, however, do not result
in a meaningful difference in substance between shareholder proposal
no-action letters and other no-action letters, which the Medical Committee opinion concedes are unreviewable under section 25 (a). The adversary aspects of the shareholder proposal review process, which
Medical Committee attributes to the intervention of the proposing
shareholder, are overplayed.' 3 0 The fact that the burden of proof is
placed on management is no different from the ordinary no-action
situation where a party requests SEC affirmation that the party is
entitled to an exemption from the securities laws. The burden of proof
is always on the person claiming an exemption.'- And, theoretically,
even if the proposing shareholder elected not to intervene in the proceeding to determine whether his proposal had to be included in
management's proxy material, the process would proceed unaffected,
since the agency is charged with protecting -the rights of investors under
the proxy rules. 3 2
Apart from the arguments that the shareholder proposal review
process embodies the essence of a formal trial-type hearing, the District
of Columbia Circuit attempts to show that the SEC itself categorizes
the shareholder proposal review process as a formal proceeding. Disregarding the informal nature of the actions taken by the SEC staff in
arriving at a no-action recommendation, the District of Columbia Circuit points to the commission's regulations, which distinguish between
formal proceedings and informal proceedings. 3 3 Section 201.1(c) of
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See 432 F.2d at 670; 19 Fed. Reg. 246 (1954).
130. See note 98 supra.
131. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953); SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137, 156 (5th Cir. 1972).
132. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
133. Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 669-70 (D.C. Cir.
1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
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the SEC regulations' states that the statutes and the rules published
under those statutes prescribe the course and method of formal procedures to be followed in SEC proceedings. The court, in effect, argues
that since the SEC has promulgated detailed rules to govern proceedings under section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act, the shareholder
proposal review process must be a "formal proceeding."' 13 5 The court
then notes that section 201.1(d) of the SEC regulations states that
informal proceedings of the commission are largely concerned with the
giving of advice by the members of the commission staff. 13 6 Finally,
the court looks to a section of the SEC brief which states that the SEC
has not found it necessary to prescribe rules in the normal no-action
situation (as opposed to shareholder proposal no-action) because in the
former there is only one interested party. 3 7 From this the court concludes that the difference between formal and informal SEC proceedings depends upon whether the process by which the action is taken
is governed by detailed rules.' 3 Since the court previously had found
that the no-action determination qualified as an "order,"' 3 and since the
review process by the above reasoning was found to be a formal proceeding, the no-action determination allegedly satisfied all the conditions of section 25(a).
In making the above argument, however, the court ignored the
fact that part 202 of the commission's regulations, 4 ° which deals with
informal and other procedures, includes a description of the processing
of proxy materials filed with the SEC. Section 202.5(d) specifically
discusses the issuance of no-action letters as a part of the informal proceedings section of the SEC regulations. Thus, the SEC is correct in
maintaining that the shareholder proposal review process is an informal
proceeding.
C. Cases Subsequent to Medical Committee Which Shed Light on the
Breadth of Section 25 (a)
The critique of Medical Committee would be complete at this
134. 17 C.F.R. § 202.1(c) (1976).
135. 432 F.2d at 669 n.l1.
136. Id. at 669 & n.11.
137. Id. at 669.
138. The court's reasoning in Medical Committee is implicit rather than explicit.
The argument in the text has been reconstructed from the court's inferences which come
in part from the portions quoted from the SEC's Supplementary Memorandum and the
italicized portion of 17 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1976) quoted in note 11 of the opinion.
139. 432 F.2d at 665-68.
140. 17 C.F.R. § 202 (1976).
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point if it were not for developments in the application of statutory
review provisions subsequent to Medical Committee which are eroding
the distinction between quasi-judicial orders and administrative rule
making. Until recently, the courts in construing statutory review provisions similar to section 25(a) refused to review agency rules on the
ground that they were not quasi-judicial orders,14 1 leaving such review
to the district courts under the Administrative Procedure Act. 1 42 However, in City of Chicago v. Federal Power Commission,-43 the District
of Columbia Circuit held that Federal Power Commission rules setting
area rates were reviewable in the court of appeals under a statutory
review provision if the court had the full and complete evidentiary
record of the hearings before the commission. Deutsche Lufthansa
Aktiengesellschaft v. CAB1 44 went beyond City of Chicago. There, a
foreign air carrier challenged a regulation promulgated by the CAB
requiring all domestic and foreign air carriers to include on their
passenger tickets a notice of the liability limitation for baggage loss or
damage. The District of Columbia Circuit declared that where evidence is assembled by an agency and where the contested issues are
legal in nature, administrative regulations are ripe for review in the
appellate courts; the touchstone for appellate review is the availability
of a record for review, not the classification of the administrative action
as quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative.
The Deutsche Lufthansa holding seems to bolster the argument
for reviewing shareholder proposal no-action decisions under section
25(a). The case erases the distinction between judicial and nonjudicial orders and states that an evidentiary hearing is not required where
the issues are legal in nature. The case does not, however, purport
to extend statutory review to essentially informal agency actions which
are not taken pursuant to statutory authority to promulgate rules or to
enter orders having the force of law.
Instead, Deutsche Lufthansa
embodies the principle that where a formal agency function including
141. See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 181 F.2d 796 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827 (1950); cf. Division of Prod., Am. Petroleum Inst. v.
Halaby, 307 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1962); Sun Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 304 F.2d
293, (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 861 (1962); Wisconsin v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 292 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 236 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 968 (1957); Arrow Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 182 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 828 (1950).
142. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(13), 704 (1970). See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. CAB,
257 F.2d 229 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 881 (1958).
143. 458 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
144. 479 F.2d 912 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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both rule making and adjudication is handled in an informal manner
(such as notice and comment rule making under section 4 of the
APA), an appellate court, under a statute similar to section 25(a), has
jurisdiction to review the action taken even though the agency failed
to hold formal hearings. The holding of the case would permit direct
review of commission rules enacted to govern shareholder proposals;
such rules arguably would affect the legal rights of complainants with
a finality contemplated by section 25(a). But Deutsche Lufthansa
would not allow for review of SEC no-action decisions under section
25(a). The Securities Exchange Act withholds the power to enter
orders governing the content management's proxy materials, and noaction determinations do not adversely affect shareholders, who can still
proceed independently to enforce their rights in court.
Moreover, there is precedent which would bar extension of the
Deutsche Lufthansa holding to section 25(a). In a decision which
appeared contemporaneously with Deutsche Lufthansa, the Third
Circuit held that quasi-legislative actions of the SEC are not reviewable
under section 25(a). The petitioners in PBW Stock Exchange, Inc.
4 5
v. SEC"
had challenged a commission rule promulgated under section 19(b) of the Securities Exchange Act which restricted membership
on a national exchange to brokerage firms conducting at least 80 percent of their business with "non-affiliated persons." The opinion states
that the legislative history of the Securities Exchange Act reveals that
Congress purposefully granted the SEC the option of regulating
exchanges either by rules or by order.' 4 6 If the commission chooses to
proceed by order, the action is reviewable under section 25(a) in the
court of appeals. If, on the other hand, the commission elects to
promulgate a rule, the rule is not reviewable under section 25(a). The
court rejected the petitioner's argument that cases arising under the
Urgent Deficiencies Act, 1 ' most notably Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States,14 required that commission rules, as well as
orders, be reviewable under section 25(a).' 4 9 The Third Circuit
observed that neither the legislative history of the Urgent Deficiencies
Act nor the precedents arising under the act could be attributed to section 25(a).'5 0 The court, however, was careful to note that its dis145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

485 F.2d 718 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974).
Id. at 722-26.
See note 83 supra.
316 U.S. 407 (1942).
485 F.2d at 726-3 1.
Id. at 731 n.14.
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missal for lack of jurisdiction under section 25(a) did not rule out the
possibility that a district court would have jurisdiction under the APA
or its general jurisdiction to review rules promulgated by the SEC. 5 '
The opinion's narrow interpretation of section 25(a) reaffirms the principle that the statutory review provision is restricted to quasi-judicial
orders of the SEC.
The distinction between orders which are reviewable in the court
of appeals under section 25(a) and other agency actions which are
reviewable in the district court is consistent with the District of Columbia Circuit's decision in Independent Broker-DealersTrade Association
v. SEC.'52 There, the court held that a letter from the commission to
a stock exchange, requesting a change in the exchange's rate structure,
was reviewable under the APA as "final agency action." At the time
this case was decided, section 19(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
specified a two-step procedure for the regulation of national securities
exchanges.' 53 The challenged letter-a formal request by the commission that the exchange voluntarily change its practices-was the first
step in the statutory scheme.' 54 If the exchange refused to comply,
the SEC took the second step under 19(b), which was to promulgate
a rule or to enter an order directing the exchange to alter or supplement
its rules. 5 5 The court held that the commission's letter constituted
"agency action" under the APA. 5 6 Consequently, it vacated the district court's dismissal for want of jurisdiction. The District of Columbia
Circuit noted that the concept of agency action reviewable under the
APA is distinct from the concept of order in section 25 (a):
Section 25(a) applies in terms only to "orders," a narrower concept than that of "agency action" reviewable in district courts, and
is available only to persons who were "parties" to actual agency
proceedings. It was intended to provide direct review in cases
wherein a clear, formal record of an administrative hearing would
be before the reviewing court without the need for presentation
to a court of evidence (or affidavit) of the agency's action.' 5 7
A commission shareholder proposal no-action letter is less formal
than a commission request letter once required under section 19(b)
151. Id. at 721-22 n.3, 733.
152. 442 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
153. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1970). Section 19(b) was amended by 15 U.S.C. § 78s
(c) (Supp. V, 1975). The Commission may now alter the rules upon notification and
after the opportunity for a hearing.
154. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1970).
155. Id.
156. 442 F.2d at 137.
157. Id. at 143.
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because there is no provision in the Securities Exchange Act for noaction letters. 5 " If the court's reasoning in Independent BrokerDealers was correct, and the requests then required under section 19
were properly reviewable in the district courts under the APA rather
than in the court of appeals under section 25(a), shareholder proposal
no-action letters should be reviewed there also.
D. The Choice Between Direct Review in the Court of Appeals and
in the District Courts
The District of Columbia Circuit conceded in Medical Committee
that the question whether a no-action determination qualifies as a
section 25(a) order is a close question." 9 The court invoked two general principles of judicial review to swing the balance in favor of direct
review in the court of appeals. First, the court cited the Abbott
Laboratories'6" doctrine that there is a strong presumption that administrative action is judicially reviewable.'16 Second, and more important,
the court concluded that pragmatic considerations favor direct review
of SEC action rather than the shareholder's private action against the
company. 6 ' The Medical Committee opinion stresses the fact that
Congress intended the Securities Exchange Act to be implemented by
the SEC, not by private actions brought by individual security holders. "6' 3 Also, direct review permits judicial supervision of the SEC to
ensure that the investing public obtains vigorous, efficient and even
handed implementation of the theory of corporate democracy incorpor64
ated in the proxy rules.'
The Medical Committee opinion, however, does not compare the
relative advantages of direct review in the court of appeals with direct
review in the district courts. The general principles of judicial review
which the court used to find a no-action determination reviewable are
neutral regarding which court should do the reviewing. First, the
Abbott Laboratoriesprinciple that there is a presumption in favor of
direct review of administrative action does not support a preference for
review in the court of appeals under section 25(a). Abbott Labora158.

See Lockhart, supra note 98, at 95.

159. 432 F.2d 659, 688 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
160. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); see notes 178-86 & accompanying text infra for a discussion of this case.
161.

432 F.2d at 666.

162. Id. at 667, 672.
163. Id. at 672.
164. Id.
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tores6 5 is a case under the APA; arguably, its precise holding is that
there is a presumption of direct review in the district courts. Second,
the argument that Congress intended the Securities Exchange Act to
be enforced by the SEC and the argument that judicial supervision of
the proxy process is advantageous have equal force when applied to
district court review under the Administrative Procedure Act. Since
review of informal action under the APA is an alternative to statutory
review, there is no need to distort the "order" and "proceeding"
requirements of the specialized statutory review provisions to provide
a forum for the review of informal agency action in the court of appeals.
Practical considerations, however, favor direct review of informal
agency action in the district courts rather than in the court of appeals.
First, there is no reason to add to the workload of the court of appeals
when the district courts are equally capable of reviewing informal
administrative action. Since there are many more district courts than
courts of appeals, there will be less delay if direct review of informal
agency action is handled initially in the district courts. The time it
takes to have informal action reviewed is a major consideration because
delay either increases the detriment suffered by the complaining party
or impedes the administrative process, depending on whether the plaintiff's or the agency's position is sustained. Second, the district courts
are better equipped than the courts of appeals to review informal agency
action. The district court, unlike the court of appeals, has wide ranging
discovery powers, 16 6 and effective judicial review of agency actions
165. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
166. Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that the rules govern
procedures in the United States District Courts. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
including the discovery provisions of Rules 26-37, do not apply to the courts of appeals.
See Hines v. Royal Indemnity Co., 253 F.2d 111, 113 (6th Cir. 1958).
Section 25(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and equivalent statutory review provisions envision that questions of fact will be restricted to issues raised in the
record made before the agency. The statute provides that any party may apply to the
court of appeals for leave to adduce additional evidence, but such additional evidence
is to be taken in a hearing before the agency. Neither the statutory review provision
nor the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and in particular Rules 15-20 which deal
with review of administrative orders, provide for independent discovery outside of the
administrative hearing.
It has been held in isolated cases that the appellate courts possess authority under
the "all writs" statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970), to utilize discovery procedures similar
to those contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Olson Rug Co. v. NLRB,
291 F.2d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 1961); Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. v. NLRB, 120 F.2d
126 (1st Cir. 1941). The fact that a court of appeals can order discovery on an ad
hoe basis with respect to administrative practices and procedures does not offset the advantage which the district court has in having express and detailed discovery rules which
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requires factfinding capabilities. There will be occasions when plaintiffs will challenge not only the legality of informal agency action but
also the way in which the decision was reached. For example, the
decision may be attacked as arbitrary and capricious on factual grounds,
or the plaintiffs may attack the informal action on the ground that it
is inconsistent with past agency practice. Also, the question of ripeness
for review may involve contested factual issues. Third, the district
courts have injunctive powers which are not shared by the court of
appeals. 6" The district courts are therefore able to afford more complete relief to the party aggrieved by the administrative action. Finally,
once a court decides to review informal administrative action, it must
then decide substantive legal questions concerning the power of the
agency and the proper interpretation of administrative acts. The
quality of the substantive decisions may be enhanced if the district court
resolves the issues initially, with the court of appeals playing its traditional appellate role.
To recapitulate, section 25(a)-type statutory review provisions are
reserved for formal quasi-judicial administrative orders which have the
same legal effect as the decisions of a lower court. Such orders are reviewable in the court of appeals even if the administrative agency adopts
them informally. Medical Committee muddies the waters of judicial
review of informal administrative action by creating the possibility that
a broad range of informal administrative actions will be reviewed in the
court of appeals under the specialized section 25(a)-type statutory
review provisions. An examination of the Medical Committee jurisdictional analysis has revealed that the court's reasoning is distorted. For
theoretical and practical reasons, direct review of informal administrative action should be restricted to the district courts under the
168
Administrative Procedure Act.
govern pretrial procedure and the experience which the district court judges have in administering the discovery rules.

167. In Medical Committee the District of Columbia Circuit conceded that there
would be situations where the district courts would be able to grant more effective relief:
"The petitioner does not seek any relief which is peculiarly within the competence of
the district court; instead, it seeks merely to have the cause remanded so that the Commission, in accord with proper standards, can make an enlightened determination of
whether enforcement action would be appropriate." 432 F.2d 659, 672 (D.C. Cir.
1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure empowers the district courts to
grant injunctive relief. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure do not contain similar
provisions, although injunctive relief might be available on an ad hoc basis under the
"all writs" statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970).

168.

Judicial review of SEC actions under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is
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Direct Review of Informal Staff Action

In Medical Committee, the District of Columbia Circuit stated that
the reviewability of shareholder proposal no-action letters hinges on the
initial decision of the commission to review the staff's no-action decistructured as follows: Formal commission orders which are entered or should have been
entered after a statutory proceeding are reviewable in the court of appeals under section
25(a). The court of appeals retains jurisdiction over such orders even if the agency
enters the order informally (that is, without holding a trial-type hearing) for reasons
of efficiency, to evade statutory review, or because the facts are undisputed and the
agency is faced with a legal question which can be decided on the basis of briefs without a formal hearing being held. See Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC,
432 F.2d 659, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972); Cities Service Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 255 F.2d 860, 863 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 837 (1958). Interim orders entered in advance of formal hearings which resemble in legal effect the final order which ultimately will be entered in a formal proceeding are reviewable under section 25(a); cf. Cities Service Gas Co. v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 255 F.2d 860 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 837 (1958); Phillips
Petroleum v. Federal Power Comm'n, 227 F.2d 470 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 1005 (1956); Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 990 (1954). Commission actions which operate "particularly rather than
generally-with a judgment entered on a state of facts and affecting only one person"
are reviewable as orders in the court of appeals even though the action in question is
not designated as an order and is issued without a trial-type hearing. See American
Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. SEC, 93 F.2d 236, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (emphasis added);
cf. Philadelphia Co. v. SEC, 164 F.2d 889 (D.C. Cir. 1947) cert. denied, 333 U.S. 828
(1948). Interlocutory orders entered in a formal proceeding are ordinarily unreviewable
until the entry of the final order. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 304 U.S. 375 (1938); R.A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 299 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir.) cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 911 (1962); Eastern Utilities Assoc. v. SEC, 162 F.2d 385 (1st Cir.
1947); Jones v. SEC, 79 F.2d 617 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 705 (1935). If
the plaintiff alleges irreparable injury, action in excess of statutory powers, or lack of
jurisdiction, he can obtain judicial review of interlocutory orders entered in a formal proceeding in the district courts under the APA or the courts general equity jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970); see Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Comm'n, 306
U.S. 56 (1939); Shields v. Utah Idaho Central R.R., 305 U.S. 177 (1938); Wolf Corp.
v. SEC, 317 F.2d 139 (D.C. Cir. 1963); R.A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 299 F.2d 127
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 911 (1962). Informal actions of the SEC are reviewable in the district courts under the APA, the Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C.
§ 2201 (1970)), or the courts' general jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970)). Potomac Fed. Corp. v. SEC, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. I
94,704 (D.D.C. 1974); Independent Broker-Dealers Trade Assoc. v. SEC, 442 F.2d 132
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 828 (1971); First Savings & Loan Ass'n v. SEC,
358 F.2d 358 (5th Cir. 1966); Silver King Mines, Inc. v. Cohen, 261 F. Supp. 666 (D.
Utah 1966). SEC rules are unreviewable under section 25(a) in the court of appeals,
but are reviewable as final agency action in the district courts under the APA or under
the courts' general jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970); see PBW Stock Exch. v. SEC,
485 F.2d 718 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974); National Resources
Defense Council v. SEC, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,910
(D.D.C.1974).
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sion. 16 9 Subsequently, Kixmiller transformed the Medical Committee
dictum into a holding by finding that a staff no-action letter which the
commission has refused to reconsider is unreviewable in the court of
appeals under section 25(a).170 In a related development, the same
court in NationalAutomatic Laundry17 1 distinguished between informal
advisory opinions signed by the head of an agency, which were ripe for
review under the Administrative Procedure Act, and staff advisory
opinions, which were not. Finally, Potomac Federal Corporation integrated the two lines of cases by holding that staff action letters which
the commission has refused to review are unreviewable under the
APA.17 2
There is, however, no need to create a rigid distinction between
staff and commission action for purposes of judicial review under the
APA. Since informal staff action can have serious consequences, it
warrants judicial review. The policies behind review of judicial
action are better served if the courts apply flexible ripeness standards
to staff action. The fact that the informal action sought to be reviewed
is staff action rather than action by the head of an agency is admittedly
a factor to be considered in determining whether judicial review is
appropriate, but it should not be a conclusive factor requiring the court
to refuse review.
A. Medical Committee and Kixmiler Do Not Bar Review of Staff
Action Under the Administrative Procedure Act
In the framework of the Medical Committee analysis, the
distinction which the Kixmiller court made between the reviewability
of staff and commission action under section 25(a) is supportable. As
Kixmiller emphasized, a staff no-action determination which the SEC
refuses to review is not a commission order. Consequently, staff shareholder proposal no-action determinations do not qualify for direct
review in the court of appeals under section 25(a) even though noaction determinations by the commission would qualify under the Medical Committee analysis.
169. Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 675 (D.C. Cir.
1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
170. Kixmiller v. SEC, 492 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
171. National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689
(D.C. Cir. 1971). The court stated, "The overwhelming bulk of these [advisory interpretations] are not given by the agency head, and are not within the scope of our ruling
announced today." Id. at 702.
172. Potomac Fed. Corp. v. SEC, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FD. SEC. L.
REP. 94,704, at 96,328 (D.C.C. 1974).
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The jurisdictional sweep of the APA, however, is not limited to

commission orders. Unlike section 25(a), the APA does not require
that the commission approve the staff no-action determination on the
merits178as a precondition for judicial review. Section 10(a) of the
APA provides that a person adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action is entitled to judicial review 174 A staff shareholder proposal noaction determination constitutes agency action.1 7 Consequently, the
reasoning used in Kixmiller to bar review of staff shareholder proposal

no-action determinations as orders under section 25 (a) does not bar the
reviewability of staff no-action determinations under the APA.
B. Ripeness Under the Administrative Procedure Act

The fact that a shareholder proposal no-action determination
173. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
174. A proposing shareholder has standing to seek judicial review of the no-action
determination under section 10 of the APA. The shareholder is within the zone of interest protected by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and he has been injured in fact
by the SEC no-action determination. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
(1972); Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). The shareholder is injured in fact
because he will have to bring an expensive private action against the company in order
to vindicate his rights under the SEC proxy rules. As a practical matter, most investors
cannot afford to pursue judicial relief and they will abandon their proposals once the
SEC refuses to bring an enforcement action against the company. Moreover, the SEC's
decision reinforces the company's decision to exclude the proposal, and thus the SEC
is partly responsible for the injury to the shareholder's interests. See Independent
Broker-Dealers' Trade Ass'n v. SEC, 442 F.2d 132, 137 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Realistically,
a company's decision to exclude a shareholder's proposal is contingent on SEC acquiesence. For the vast majority of companies, a commission no-action letter is necessary to make the exclusion decisi6n final. See generally Schwartz, The Public Interest
Proxy Contest, Reflections on Campaign G.M., 69 MIcH. L. REv. 419, 434 (1971).
The shareholder is within the zone of interest protected by the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, as the protection of investors is among the express purposes of section 14
(a), the section dealing with proxies. See J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432
(1964); Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 675 (D.C. Cir.
1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
175. Agency action includes the "whole or a part of an agency rule, order. . . or
failure to act." 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1970). A shareholder proposal no-action determination qualifies either as an APA order or a failure to act. Section 551(6) of the APA
defines an order as "the whole or a part of a final disposition, whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other than rule making. . . ." 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (1970). A shareholder proposal no-action letter states
that the agency has studied the company's arguments and intends to take no further action on the matter. Consequently, the no-action determination is a final negative disposition. The no-action determination also constitutes a failure to act.
Potomac Fed. Corp. v. SEC, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
RE'. 94,704 (D.D.C. 1974) held that a staff action letter which the commission considered and sent back to the staff for re-publication constituted final agency action reviewable under the APA.
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qualifies as agency action, however, is merely the beginning of the

jurisdictional inquiry. A ripeness analysis is required under the APA,
for section 10(c) of the act further limits the set of reviewable agency
actions to "final agency actions.' 176 Moreover, injunctive relief is a discretionary remedy, and courts are reluctant to apply such remedies to

administrative actions unless the controversy is ripe for judicial
review.

1 77

In Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,1 7 the Supreme Court presented a methodology for determining whether administrative action
is ripe for review under the APA.

The question whether a particular

action is ripe for review is largely a matter of common sense.' 79 On
the one hand, the court weighs the fitness of the issues for judicial deci-

sion.'

°

The concept of fitness for judicial review incorporates (1)

finality of agency action, 8 (2) appropriateness of the issues for judicial decision, 8 2 and (3) the practical impact which judicial review will
have on the administrative agency. 8 3 On the other hand, the court
balances the hardship to the complaining party if judicial review is withheld or delayed.'
In Medical Committee, the court stated, "[P]ragmatic considerations, particularly those relating to the institutional
relationships between the courts and the administrative agencies, must
prevail over purely doctrinal arguments for or against reviewability.' 8
If, however, competing considerations are closely balanced, the issue
should be resolved in favor of review, for the APA embodies a presumption of judicial review.'8 6
C. The General Rule that Staff Action Is Not Ripe
In the leading case of National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning
176. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970).
177. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967).
178. Id.
179. See Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 522 F.2d 107, 124 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
180. 387 U.S. at 149.
181. Id.
182. Id. See also National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443
F.2d 689, 695 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
183. Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 522 F.2d 107, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
184. 387 U.S. at 148-49. See also Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 522 F.2d
107, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1975); National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz,
443 F.2d 689, 696 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
185. 432 F.2d at 667.
186. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 134, 140 (1967); Continental
Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 522 F.2d 107, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1975); National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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Council v. Shultz, 1 87 the District of Columbia Circuit held that an

informal interpretive letter signed by the head of an agency is presumptively authoritative and thus final for purposes of review.1 88 In that
particular case, the letter was a definitive statement of the agency's
position which was entitled to judicial deference if a private court action
were brought. 8 9 The court noted that staff interpretive letters do not
constitute final agency action; they have no legal significance in a
private action and are not definitive statements of the agency's position
because they may be overturned by the head of the agency. 90
In Potomac Federal Corporationv. SEC,' 9 ' the court held that an
SEC action letter was reviewable as final agency action under section
25(a). The opinion carefully notes, however, that staff action letters
are unreviewable in the courts if the commission refused to reconsider
the staff determination. 92 The court cited Kixmiller for this conclusion without explaining why staff action is not ripe for review under
the APA as opposed to section 25(a). 98
Finally, Koss v. SEC' 9' applied ripeness principles to preclude
review of a staff opinion letter under the APA. In Koss, the SEC staff
sent letters of comment to issuers employing the plaintiff's services as
underwriter, stating that their offering circulars would have to be
revised to disclose that the plaintiff was under investigation by the
SEC. After the plaintiff filed suit, the commission rescinded the staffs
comment letter. The chief of the branch of small issues in the division
of corporate finance wrote the plaintiff that disclosure of the SEC
investigation would not be required in subsequent offering circulars distributed by the plaintiff's clients. However, the plaintiff would be
requested by the appropriate regional SEC offices to inform any issuer
of a Regulation A'95 offering which plaintiff was underwriting that he
was under investigation and that if he were suspended by the SEC, the
issuer's Regulation A registration might be forfeited. The district court
dismissed the action on the ground that staff letters of comment were
not ripe for review. The staff's comments did not represent the
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
1974).
192.
193.
194.
195.

443 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Id. at 701.
Id. at 697, 702.
Id. at 699-702.
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
Id. at 96,328.
Id.
364 F. Supp. 1321 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263 (1976).

94,704 (D.D.C.
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opinion of the commission and thus stopped far short of an actual threat
of SEC enforcement. Moreover, the commission did not appear to be
reluctant to oversee the staffs activities. In particular, the fact that the
commission had rescinded the staff's initial letter of comment demonstrated that the staff's opinion letters were not definitive.
The three courts are agreed that informal staff actions are not ripe
for direct review. Potomac Federal Corporation states flatly that staff
action is unreviewable unless the head of an agency decides first to
review the staff action. 196 However, no persuasive reasons were
advanced as to why district courts should not apply ripeness criteria to
determine whether the practical consequences of informal staff action
are sufficiently serious to warrant direct review.
D. The Fact that the Action Sought To Be Reviewed Is Staff Action
Should Not Preclude Review
97
National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Schultz
cited three reasons why staff action is not ripe for review. First, staff
opinions, unlike opinions signed by the head of an agency have no legal
effect. 1 8 Second, staff opinions are not authoritative and are subject
to reversal by the head of an agency. 99 Third, subjecting staff
opinions to judicial review might prompt the agencies to restrict the
availability of informal advice.2"' Although the reasons outlined above
should be considered by a court in determining whether a particular
staff action should be reviewed, they are not sufficient in themselves
to preclude judicial review of all informal staff actions. In particular,
staff shareholder proposal no-action letters which the commission
refuses to review are ripe for review under the Administrative Procedure Act.

1.

The Legal Effect Argument

The fact that an opinion signed by the head of an agency is
entitled to deference from the courts is a persuasive reason for reviewing the opinion. This should not mean, however, that staff opinions
are necessarily unreviewable because they lack the same legal impact.
196.
1974).
197.
198.
199.
200.

[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
443 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Id. at 697.
Id. at 700.
Id. at 669-700.

94,704 (D.D.C.
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In ContinentalAir Lines, Inc. v. CAB,2 0 1 the District of Columbia Circuit specifically stated that informal actions may be reviewable even
though the action is never to have any formal legal effect. 202 The important consideration is the practicaleffect which the action will have.20 3
Legal consequences are only one of the many types of practical effects
an administrative action may have. In Koss, 20 4 the practical effect of
the SEC's requesting the plaintiff to inform issuers employing his services that he was under investigation was that he would lose business.
The plaintiff was entitled to some form of judicial review of the staff
action before he lost his livelihood. In the case of the shareholder proposal no-action letter, the practical effect of a decision to issue a noaction letter made at the staff level is equivalent to that made at the
commission level: the shareholder is deprived of agency assistance.
2. The Need for an Authoritative Agency Ruling
The National Automatic Laundry court indicated that there were
two aspects to the authoritative agency ruling requirement. The first
aspect was that the ruling must be the final or ultimate expression of
the office or agency on the matter. 205 The court observed that the
requirement of an authoritative ruling was akin to the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. 20 6 The second aspect of the
authoritative determination requirement was that the action must be a
final rather than a tentative position.20 7 The court might refuse to
review an action which was taken by the head of an agency if the
agency presented evidence that the matter was still under meaningful
refinement and development. 0 8
The exhaustion doctrine requires that the plaintiff pursue his
administrative remedies before bringing an action for direct review.
There is no danger, however, of the court prematurely interfering with
the administrative process after the plaintiff has sought and been
denied review of the staff action by the head of the agency. The
agency's consideration of the matter at this point will have ended.
Once the highest authority in an agency refuses to review staff action,
201. 522 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
202. Id. at 124.
203. See id. at 124 & n.5.
204. Koss v. SEC, 364 F. Supp. 1321 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
205. 443 F.2d 689, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 700-01.
208. Id. at 701-03.
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the staff action should be treated as the agency's action for purposes
of direct review.
As far as the need for a settled action goes, there is no inherent
reason why staff action which the head of an agency has refused to
review should be considered tentative. In many instances, the staff
action may consist of applying established law to particular facts.
When the head of the agency refuses to review the staff action, the staff
action is dispositive of the issue. Moreover, as the court noted in New
York Stock Exchange, Inc. v. Smith,2 0 9 an opinion letter signed by the
head of an agency is presumptively final for purposes of review even
though it could be reconsidered by the agency at any time.21 0 Similarly,
once the head of an agency has refused to review a staff action, the
staff action should be considered presumptively final even though the
official agency position on the matter might shift at a later date. In
any event, if the staff action is tentative, the agency is free to bring
that fact to the attention of the court.
3.

The Argument that Review of Staff Action Might Result in a Cut-Back
in Agency Advice

The extension of direct review to informal staff action would be
counterproductive if the agencies responded by cutting back on the
availability of informal advice. There is no reason to believe, however,
that direct judicial review of informal staff action would bring about
such a result. First, the courts will be selective in applying ripeness
criteria to staff action. Since staff advice does not command deference
in the courts, the courts will demand a greater showing of need on the
part of the plaintiff before allowing direct review. Direct review will
be reserved for those instances where the case of such review of staff
action is particularly compelling. Second and more important, the
courts can take affirmative steps to ensure that informal advice is available. There is a developing body of case law requiring administrators
to give reasons for their actions.2 1 ' Similarly, a reviewing court can
require an agency to provide reasons why it refused to give informal
advice to a plaintiff who is affected by the law which the agency
209. 404 F. Supp. 1091 (D.D.C. 1975).
210. Id. at 1094.
211. In one case, the Supreme Court held that the Secretary of Labor was required
to provide the court with a statement of reasons why he refused to bring a civil action
to set aside a labor election. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975). See text accompanying notes 223-27 infra.
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administers. 21 2 If the court is dissatisfied with the agency's reasons,
it can order the agency to provide an advisory opinion.
In summary, the courts should not automatically refuse to review
informal staff action under the APA. Rather, the courts should apply
the Abbott Laboratoriesripeness tests with particular sensitivity to the
practical impact the staff action has on the aggrieved party.
IV. The Legal Basis for Direct Review of Staff No-Action
Determinations Under the Administrative Procedure Act
Section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act2 13 provides
that a person adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action is
entitled to judicial review. 1 4 This broad grant is narrowed by the
introductory clause of section 10(a) which excludes judicial review
where a relevant statute precludes judicial review or where action is committed to agency discretion by law.2 15 A number of recent cases have
held that district courts have subject matter jurisdiction to review informal SEC action under the APA. 18 Because these cases have found
that section 25(a) of the Securities Exchange Act does not preclude
review under the APA, the first exception contained in the introductory
clause to 10(a) is not applicable here. The second exception, however, requires further discussion.
A. Agency Action Committed to Agency Discretion by Law
The District of Columbia Circuit in Kixmiller observed that
section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act21 7 grants the SEC
unreviewable discretion to undertake investigations and to bring enforcement actions.2 "" From this the court concludes that a no-action
letter is unreviewable under the APA because it is agency action com212. 421 U.S. at 571-72. See generally, Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
213. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
214. A shareholder proposal no-action determination qualifies as agency action.
See note 175 supra.
215. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1), (2) (1970).
216. See Independent Broker-Dealers Trade Assoc. v. SEC, 442 F.2d 132 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); National Resources Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. If 94,910 (D.D.C. 1974); Potomac Fed. Corp. v. SEC, [19741975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,704 (D.D.C. 1974); Koss v. SEC,
364 F. Supp. 1321 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (court had subject matter jurisdiction but staff noaction determination was not ripe).
217. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (Supp. V, 1975), amending 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1970).
218. 492 F.2d at 645.
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mitted to agency discretion by law.219 In fact, in the Kixmiller and
Medical Committee cases, the SEC had not exercised prosecutorial discretion. There was no need to make an enforcement decision because
the staff agreed with the company's legal reasons for refusing to include
the shareholder's proposal. 220 True prosecutorial discretion only comes
into play if the commission, finding that the shareholder's proposal
should be included, issues a deficiency letter with which the company
refuses to comply. 221 In the rare instances when this happens, the SEC
must then engage in a cost-benefit analysis regarding the value of
bringing an enforcement action in the courts. There is no reason why
a court should refuse to review a no-action determination if such discretionary factors were not exercised.
Even the discretionary aspects of a prosecutorial decision are
subject to limited judicial review under the APA. 222 In Dunlop v.
Bachowski,223 Walter Bachowski, a candidate for office in a labor
union, filed a complaint with the Department of Labor alleging numerous election irregularities, violation of the union constitution, and violation of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
Following an investigation of the complaint, the secretary of labor notified Bachowski that he had decided not to bring an action to set aside
the election. Bachowski then filed an action against the secretary in
which he charged that the investigation had substantiated the charges of
election irregularities. The complaint concluded that the refusal of the
secretary to take action to set aside the election was arbitrary and
capricious. The court was asked to direct the secretary to file a civil
action to set aside the election.
219. "An agency's decision to refrain from an investigation or an enforcement action is generally unreviewable and, as to the agency before us, the specifications of the
Act leave no doubt on that score." 492 F.2d at 645.
220.

492 F.2d at 643 n.8; 432 F.2d at 679 & n.27.

The Supreme Court has said that the "committed to agency discretion" exception
is to be applied narrowly. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 410 (1971).

221.

An SEC opinion letter stating that the proposals must be included is not a

commitment of agency enforcement. Schwartz, The Public-InterestProxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign G.M., 69 MicH. L. Rzv. 419, 432 (1971).
222. See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975); Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676,
679 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (prosecutorial policies are reviewable); Hodgson v. Machinists
Lodge 851, 454 F.2d 545, 552 (7th Cir. 1971); Trailways of New England, Inc. v. CAB,
412 F.2d 926, 931-32 (1st Cir. 1969); Wong Wing Hang v. Immigration & Nat. Serv.,
360 F.2d 715, 717 (2d Cir. 1966); Brennan v. Connecticut UAW Council, 373 F. Supp.
286, 287 n.1 (D. Conn. 1974); De Vito v. Shultz, 300 F. Supp. 381, 382 (D.D.C. 1969);
Schonfield v. Wirtz, 258 F. Supp. 705, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); cf. Leedom v. Kyne, 358
U.S. 184 (1958); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
223. 421 U.S. 560 (1975).
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The Supreme Court rejected the secretary's claim that his exercise

of prosecutorial discretion was immune from review under section
10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act.2 24 The Court held that
the secretary's decision not to bring suit was subject to limited review
under section 10(e) of the APA.2 25 Section 10(e) of the APA authorizes a district court to set aside agency action found to be "arbitrary,

capricious, and abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law."22 6 To enable the reviewing court to review intelligibly the secretary's determination, the secretary was required to provide the court

and the complaining witness with copies of a statement of reasons supporting his determination. 22 7 To prevent the reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the secretary, the Supreme Court
directed that the plaintiff would not be permitted to attack the factual
2 28
bases for the secretary's conclusions in his statement of reasons..
The Bachowski decision authorizes limited judicial review of the

discretionary aspect of shareholder proposal no-action determinations. 22 Because the SEC reviews a large number of shareholder proposals each year, it is unlikely that a court will find that the SEC has
acted arbitrarily or capriciously in refusing to bring an enforcement
action in a given case. 230 However, the SEC's decision to issue a noaction letter in the face of a violation of the proxy rules can be attacked
as an abuse of discretion, as the commission has no authority to waive

violations of the Securities Exchange Act.231

224. Id. at 567-68.
225. Id. at 568.
226. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
227. 421 U.S. at 571.
228. Id. at 572-73.
229. See Littell v. Morton, 445 F.2d 1207, 1210-14 (4th Cir. 1971); Scanwell Labs.
v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Trailways of New England, Inc. v.
CAB, 412 F.2d 926, 931-33 (1st Cir. 1969); Suwannee S.S. Co. v. United States, 354
F. Supp. 1361, 1368-69 (1973); cf. Reece v. United States, 455 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir.
1972). See generally JAFrm, supranote 82, at 374-75.
230. One suggested improvement in SEC procedure would be a requirement that the
SEC express its disapproval of a company's decision to exclude a shareholder's proposal
by issuing a negative letter of comment coupled with a refusal to issue a no-action letter.
The SEC's current practice when a filing is deficient is to send a letter to the person
who filed the document bringing the deficiency to his attention and allowing opportunity
for the deficiency to be corrected. See 17 C.F.R. § 202.3(a) (1976). The practical
effect of a negative letter of comment is enormous, since most companies will voluntarily
comply with the SEC's interpretation of the proxy rules to avoid antagonizing the
agency. See Schwartz, The Public Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign
G.M., 69 MrcH. L. Rav. 419, 434 (1971).
231. See Capital Funds, Inc. v. SEC, 348 F.2d 582, 588 (8th Cir. 1965); SEC v.
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, 209 F.2d 44,49 (3d Cir. 1953).
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In summary, if the SEC sides with the company on its interpretation of the law, the court has jurisdiction under the APA to review the
alleged error of law. Prosecutorial discretion is not involved in the noaction determination. On the other hand, where the shareholder
alleges that the SEC uncovered a violation of the proxy rules but nonetheless issued a no-action letter, the court has jurisdiction to determine
whether the agency abused its discretion by issuing a no-action letter
and by refusing to bring an enforcement action.
B. Application of the Abbott Laboratory Methodology to Staff NoAction Determinations
As stated earlier,23 2 agency action must be final or ripe for review
before the courts will examine it under the Administrative Procedure
Act. Abbott Laboratoriesis the leading case on ripeness, and an application of the Abbott methodology to shareholder proposal no-action
determinations by the SEC staff shows that such determinations qualify
as "final staff action" under the APA. This methodology entails
balancing the fitness of the issues for judicial review with the hardship
on the complaining party if judicial review is refused.
1. Fitness for JudicialReview
a. The Appropriateness of the Issues for Judicial Resolution
The issues involved in a shareholder proposal dispute are well
suited for judicial resolution.23 3 The shareholder typically is contesting
a limited number of legal issues which have been fully developed
before the SEC. In most cases, the reviewing court will be able to
decide the case on briefs alone.
b. Finality of Agency Action
The exhaustion doctrine requires that the shareholder appeal a
staff no-action determination to the commission before bringing an
action for direct review.2" 4 If the commission decides to review the
staff no-action determination, the ensuing commission no-action determination is reviewable. If the commission refuses to review the staff
no-action determination, as it did in Kixmiller, then the agency
232. See notes 176-86 & accompanying text supra.
233. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967); National Automatic
Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689, 695 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
234. See No Action Decisions, supra note 76, at 865. See generally 3 DAVIS,
supra note 6, ch. 20.
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processes have come to an end. There is no danger that the court will
intervene in the dispute while the agency is still in the process of deciding whether it will bring an enforcement action.23 5

Once the commission refuses to review the staff no-action determination, the no-action determination can be considered "commission
action" for purposes of review under the literal language of a little
explored amendment to the Securities Exchange Act. Section 3 of the
Securities Acts Amendments of 1975236 authorizes the SEC to delegate
its powers to the staff by published order or rule. If the commission
exercises its discretion not to review a determination made pursuant to
the delegated powers, the amendment provides that the staff action shall
for all purposes, "including appeal or review thereof, be deemed the
'
action of the Commission. "237
The commission has promulgated specific rules in which it
formally delegates authority to particular officers of the SEC pursuant
to section 78d-1 of the act.238 For example, the chief of the division
of corporate finance has been delegated power to accelerate the effective date of registration statements.2 9 Section 78d-l(c), however,
does not require an explicit statement that a delegation of authority is
being made pursuant to section 78d-1 of the act. It can be argued that
for purposes of review, a general delegation of responsibility to the SEC
staff is sufficient for the review provisions of section 78d-1 to apply.
The handling of proxy filings is delegated to the division of corporate
finance. 240 Under section 78d-l(c), this could be deemed the action
of the commission for review purposes. As constructive commission
action, the staff shareholder proposal no-action determination would be
ripe for review under the Administrative Procedure Act.
There is no reason for the courts to refrain from reviewing staff
shareholder proposal no-action letters on the ground that they are tenta235. See Port of Boston M.T. Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S.
62, 71 (1970); National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d
689, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
236. 15 U.S.C. § 78d-l(a) (Supp. V, 1975), amending 15 U.S.C. § 78d-l(a)
(1970).
237. "Should the right to exercise such review be declined, or should no such review be sought within the time stated in the rules promulgated by the Commission, then
the action of any such division of the Commission... or employee board... shall,
for all purposes, including appeal or review thereof, be deemed the action of the Commission." 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(c) (1970) (emphasis added).
238. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1 (1970).
239. 17 C.F.R. § 200.30-1(a)(5)(i) (1976).
240. Id. § 202.3(a) (1976).
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tive or subject to reconsideration. 41 The shareholder's interests are
harmed as much by a staff no-action recommendation which the commission has refused to review as they are by a commission affirmation
on the merits.2 42 The practical effects of the no-action decision are
final, as the proposal is omitted from the upcoming annual shareholders'
meeting.
c. Practical Impact on the SEC of Direct Review of Staff No-Action
Determinations

The costs of permitting direct review are minimal, for the number
of suits which will be brought against the SEC for review of shareholder
proposal no-action determinations will be small. First, only a fraction
of the proxy materials filed each year involve an attempt by management to exclude a shareholder's proposal.2 43 Second, the most common grounds for issuing shareholder proposal no-action letters include
failure to submit a proposal by the proxy deadlines 24 4 and failure to
include the required statement that the shareholder will be present at
the shareholders' meeting to introduce his proposal. 245 Finally, a
private action against the company is probably more attractive to shareholders who can afford to litigate, since they can obtain immediate
injunctive relief against the company. An action for direct review of
a no-action determination is an indirect method of accomplishing what
246
a private action can do directly.
As explained earlier, one reason the courts have been conservative
in affording direct review of informal agency action is the fear that
administrative agencies would restrict the issuance of advisory letters
to avoid potential litigation.24 7 This fear is unjustified in the case of
shareholder proposal no-action letters. The amount of energy which
241. As a practical matter, the commission honors no-action commitments made by
its staff, particularly where the commission declines to review the staff action. See 3
Loss, supra note 11, at 1843-44; Lockhart, supra note 97, at 96.
242. See No Action Decisions, supra note 76, at 864.
243. Records indicate that 6,757 proxy statements in definitive form were filed with
the SEC in fiscal 1974. Only 161 proposals submitted by 78 stockholders of 71 companies were omitted. 434 proposals submitted by 69 stockholders of 227 companies
were included. 40 SEC ANN. Rm'. 33 (1974).
244. Id.
245. 39 SEC ANN. REP. 37 (1973).
246. See notes 255-59 & accompanying text infra.
247. "To permit suits for declaratory judgments upon mere informal, advisory, administrative opinions might well discourage the practice of giving such opinions, with
a net loss of far greater proportions to the average citizen than any possible gain which
could accrue." Helco Prods. v. McNutt, 137 F.2d 681, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
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the SEC would have to expend in responding to shareholder suits under
the APA would be negligible. The number of cases would be small
and the vast majority of these challenges would be strictly legal in
nature and thus could be resolved by the submission of briefs. Direct
review of staff shareholder proposal no-action letters would not result in
long drawn-out trials. Also, the SEC cannot cut back on the availability of shareholder proposal no-action letters. The SEC must make a
decision whenever management seeks to omit a shareholder proposal. 248 As long as the proxy rules allow management to omit certain
types of shareholder proposals, the SEC will have to police companies
to ensure that the omissions are within the exceptions to the general
rule that shareholder proposals must be included in management's
proxy materials.
Finally, if the SEC wished to lessen the burden of direct review
attributable to shareholder proposal no-action decisions, it could adopt
a policy that no-action letters would be issued only in oases where
management had a clear-cut right to omit the proposal. This, of
course, would mean fewer no-action decisions from which shareholders
could appeal.
2.

Hardshipto the Parties

In considering the hardship to the proposing shareholder if judicial
review is withheld, the court was faced with a different problem in the
shareholder proposal no-action cases than it was in Abbott Laboratories,249 NationalAutomatic Laundry,25 ° or Potomac Federal Corporation.25' In those cases, the court considered whether the burden on
the plaintiff was sufficiently great to justify pre-enforcement review of
248. In its Statement of Informal Procedures, the SEC asserts that the commission
and its staff are not required to respond to management's submission in shareholder proposals. The agency position is that it provides no-action letters as a matter of convenience. Statement of Informal Procedures for the Rendering of Staff Advice With Respect to Shareholder Proposals, (July 7, 1976) [Current] CCH FED. Sac. L. REP.
80,635, at 86,605. This important fact for purposes of direct review, however, is that
the agency has issued a no-action letter, not whether the agency was required to do so.
Moreover, even if the SEC does not have to reveal its enforcement decision, the agency
still has to decide whether it will bring an action for injunctive relief at the time management indicates that it intends to omit the shareholder's proposal. The decision not
to intervene in the shareholder's behalf is judicially reviewable even if the agency fails
to advise management that it intends to take no action if the proposal is omitted.
249. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
250. 443 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
251. [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
94,704 (D.D.C.
1974).

THE HASTINGS L-AW JOURNAL

[Vol. 28

the agency action. Even if the court had dismissed the pending suit, the
plaintiff would have been able to challenge the agency's action when the
agency initiated an enforcement proceeding. In contrast, in the shareholder proposal no-action situation, the issue is not when the shareholder will be afforded judicial review; the issue is whether the
shareholder can obtain direct judicial review at all. In New York Stock
Exchange, Inc. v. Smith,2" 2 the court observed that the case for direct
review was stronger where the complaining party would never have an
opportunity to challenge administrative action by disobeying it. This
reasoning applies in the case of shareholder proposal no-action letters.
On the other hand, a denial of judicial review will not harm the
shareholder's private cause of action. The assumption in Medical
Committee that a shareholder proposal no-action determination by the
SEC itself impairs a shareholder's private action cannot be used to
justify direct review of staff determinations. While it has been argued
that a commission no-action determination should have no impact on
the shareholder's private action against the company,2 53 it is generally
agreed that a staff no-action determination is definitely limited in
impact to its persuasive value and consequently cannot contaminate the
254
shareholder's private action.
Moreover, the Medical Committee argument that the private
action is inadequate to enforce a shareholder's rights under the proxy
rules is of doubtful validity. Rafal v. Geneen25 r provides an example
of how effective a private action can be in protecting a shareholder's
rights. There, a district court acted to pass on the legality of proxies
which were solicited for use at a shareholders' meeting which was to
be held two days later. The court found that the proxy materials
omitted material facts concerning candidates for corporate office.
Proxies obtained for the election of the three candidates involved were
voided, and the election to fill three positions on the board of directors
was enjoined pending a resolicitation of proxies through "fair and truthful proxy materials. ' 25 6 Similarly, in a shareholder's private action to
compel a company to include his proposal in its proxy materials, a district court could order management to amend and recirculate its proxy
materials, to call a special shareholder's meeting to consider the pro252.

404 F. Supp. 1091, 1095 (D.D.C. 1975).

253.

See notes 99-107 & accompanying text supra.

254.

Spirt v. Bechtel, 232 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1956).

255. [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FE2D. SEc. L. REP. [93,505, at 92,440 (E.D.
Pa. 1972).
256. Id. at 92,443.
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posal, or to canvas the company's shareholders by mail concerning the
257
proposal.
Compared to a private action against a company, direct review of
an SEC no-action determination is at best an indirect method for compelling the company to include a shareholder's proposal.2 58 Even if
the SEC loses the suit brought against it by the shareholder, it can still
decline to bring an enforcement action against management on discretionary grounds. On the other hand, if the SEC decides to bring an
enforcement action, the shareholder will have the benefit of SEC assistance, but a second suit may still have to be brought to force manage2 59
ment to include the proposal in its proxy materials.
Although the private action is an adequate alternative to an action
for direct review as far as the individual shareholder is concerned, there
are a number of reasons why direct review is desirable. Allowing a
right of direct review has the advantage of keeping the SEC responsive
to the needs of proposing shareholders. 260 The primary and explicit
purpose of section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act is the protection of investors, and Congress intended that the purposes of the act
should be carried out by commission regulation of proxy statements
rather than through private actions by individual security holders. 261
Moreover, the only practicable way for most investors to contest
management's decision to exclude their proposals is through the SEC's
proxy procedures.262 Small investors cannot afford to litigate their
claims. Since the SEC proxy review procedure serves as the guardian
257. In its Proposed Amendments to the shareholder proposal rules, the SEC proposes to extend the deadlines for management to submit its reasons for omitting a shareholder proposal from thirty days before the meeting to fifty. This is to give the shareholder more time to bring a private action. Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under
the SEC Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, [Current] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 1180,634, at 86,596 (1976).
258. See JudicialReview of SEC, supra note 39, at 340-41.
259. If the SEC decides to bring an enforcement action against the company and
the company capitulates, it may be too late to include the shareholder proposal owing
to the time factors involved in bringing an action against the SEC. If the shareholder's
meeting has already been held, the best the shareholder can hope for is inclusion of his
proposal in the following year's proxy materials. The shareholder's private action promises faster and more effective relief because the district court can decide the legal issues
involved in most proxy disputes on a motion for summary judgment and can then grant
injunctive relief against the company as in Rafal v. Geneen, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. Sac. L. REP. 93,505 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
260. See No-Action Decisions, supra note 76, at 856-57.
261. Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 672 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
262. Id.
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of the rights of small investors, it is essential that the SEC consider carefully the materials filed with it, resolving disputes between shareholder
and management in accordance with an accurate perception of the congressional intent underlying the proxy provisions of the Securities Exchange Act.2 63 Direct review is the most effective way to ensure that
the SEC properly performs its duties under the act. A private action
against a company has no effect on the SEC. In a private action, the
process by which the agency arrived at its no-action determination
cannot be scrutinized.26 4 Consequently, the courts should permit
shareholders the option to obtain judicial review of the no-action determination so that they can protect their personal rights under the proxy
rules and enhance the integrity of the proxy review process in one
action.
Eliminating a right of direct review of staff shareholder proposal
no-action letters on the ground that there is an adequate remedy subverts the reasoning which motivated the Supreme Court's recognition
of an implied private right of action for proxy violations. In J.I. Case
Co. v. Borak,2 65 the Court held that a private action could be brought
by a shareholder to set aside a merger accomplished through the circulation of a false and misleading proxy statement. The Court found that
among the chief purposes of the proxy provisions of the Securities Exchange Act is the protection of investors, which implied the availability
of a private remedy where necessary to achieve that result.2 6 6 The
Court explained that private enforcement of the proxy rules provided
a necessary supplement to commission action and served as an effective weapon in the enforcement of proxy rules. 6- 7 In the shareholder
proposal no-action situation, the threat to the shareholder's rights
under the proxy provisions of the act comes not only from the company,
but also from the SEC staff, which may have misapplied the law. Just
as section 14(a) supports an implied private action to protect the
investor against management's actions, it also supports direct review of
SEC practices and interpretations of the proxy rules when necessary to
protect investors.2 68 The District of Columbia Circuit in Medical
Committee justified judicial supervision of the proxy process by noting
that a published study had accused the SEC of a variety of procedural
263.

264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
1970).

Id.

See No-Action Decisions, supra note 76, at 855.
377 U.S. 426 (1964).
Id. at 431-32.
Id. at 432.
Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 675-76 (D.C. Cir.
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sins in its regulation of proxies, most of which could be curtailed or
eliminated through judicial review. 269 It would be ironic if the implied
private action which the Supreme Court recognized as a valuable
supplement to the SEC's efforts to protect investors' rights under the
proxy rules could be used to justify the denial of a right to direct review
of SEC staff no-action determinations under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Finally, the SEC's decision to issue a no-action letter independently injures the shareholder. When management submits its
arguments for excluding the shareholder's proposal, its action is tentative, subject to reconsideration if the SEC refuses to issue a no-action
letter. The SEC's no-action decision solidifies the company's decision
to exclude the proposal.2 70 Under this view, the SEC is an independent wrongdoer. In Independent Broker-Dealer Trade Association v.
SEC, 7 1 the District of Columbia Circuit held that an informal letter
from the chairman of the SEC to the New York Stock Exchange was
reviewable because the agency was
significantly involved in the Exchange's decision to prohibit giveups, and involved in a way and to an extent that cannot be ignored
as devoid of legal materiality. That involvement of a government
agency is meaningful enough to call for application of vital princlaim that action
ciples of judicial review,
- to consider appellants'
272
was not lawfully taken.
By analogy to Independent Broker-Dealer Trade Association, the role
that the SEC plays in solidifying management's decision to omit the
shareholder's proposal means that the agency is significantly involved
in the company's decision. The fact that the agency is partially responsible for the exclusion of the shareholder's proposal should entitle the
shareholder to seek redress against Jhe SEC regardless of the adequacy
of a possible private suit against the company.
V.

Conclusion

The principles which will govern direct judicial review of informal
administrative action are in the formative stage. The courts, however,
269. Id. at 674.
270. The SEC virtually concedes this point in its Proposed Amendments where it
states that managements delay the printing of proxy materials until they receive the
staff's views despite the fact that there is no requirement that management adhere to
the staff's views. Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the SEC Act of 1934
80,634, at 86,596
Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, CCH FED. Sac. L. REP.
(1976). See note 232 & accompanying text supra.
271. 442 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
272. Id. at 137.
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have made two false starts which should be corrected to improve the
effectiveness of direct judicial review and to broaden the jurisdiction
of the courts to protect the public against arbitrary informal staff action.
First, the District of Columbia Circuit erred in Medical Committee
by permitting direct judicial review of informal action in the court of
appeals under a statutory review provision designed for the review of
formal quasi-judicial orders. Practical and theoretical considerations
favor review of informal administrative actions in the district courts
under the Administrative Procedure Act. Although Medical Committee itself has been rendered moot, the way is open for another court to
use the Medical Committee analysis to justify review of informal administrative action in the court of appeals under one of the many statutory review provisions similar to that contained in the Securities Exchange Act.
Second, the courts have made a major mistake in automatically
precluding direct judicial review of informal staff action. In particular,
staff shareholder proposal no-action letters which the SEC refuses to
review provide a perfect example of informal staff action which is ripe
for direct judicial review under the APA. The courts should apply a
flexible ripeness analysis which emphasizes the practical effects of the
informal administrative action on the complaining party rather than the
level at which the action was taken. Direct judicial review should be
available where the head of an agency refuses to review informal staff
action and the practical detriment imposed on the plaintiff outweighs
the costs to the agency.
Alternatively, it has been suggested that the proper vehicle for
reviewing all shareholder proposal no-action determinations is the
Administrative Procedure Act. Such a method of review, it has been
contended, would help bring this important area of administrative law
into line with principles of common sense and simplicity. The APA,
with its extensive body of interpretive case law, is well suited for solving the problems faced by the court of appeals in the Medical
Committee case.

